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productivity and economic growth, food security and nutrition, sustainability and 
climate change.  Yet the types of GM crops and traits currently on the market are 
widely acknowledged to have been designed to meet the needs of farmers in 
industrialised countries and to offer little to small-scale farmers in the developing 
world.  Though a range of more relevant crops and traits may be in the pipeline, they 
appear to be some way off.
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such marginal relevance to developing-country agriculture nevertheless came to be 
talked about as if the challenges of development were one of the central 
justifications for the rapid commercialisation of GM crops in both developed and 
developing countries.  Focusing on the case of the international agribusiness 
company Monsanto, the paper demonstrates that stories about sustainability and 
feeding the world played an important role in driving and shaping that company’s 
technological and commercial strategies over a period of twenty years, even though 
they had little influence over the actual content of the technologies that were being 
developed in Monsanto’s laboratories.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Genetically modified (GM, transgenic) crops have come to be widely invoked as a key 
technology for improving agriculture in the developing world, enhancing agricultural 
productivity, alleviating poverty and achieving food security at both household 
and global levels. For a few years, at least, it seemed that every discussion of 
agricultural development had to include a statement about the need for careful, 
responsible, but basically enthusiastic and rapid, development and application of 
GM crop technology in the developing world (Hisano 2005). Around the turn of the 
twenty-first century, for instance, a slew of reports, discussion papers and position 
statements emerged from various prominent bodies, including major international 
organisations and august scientific institutions, which supported and encouraged 
the urgent development of various biotechnologies, including GM crops, for various 
applications in developing-country agriculture – specifically for boosting crop yields 
and tackling hunger and malnutrition.
For example, weighty reports issued by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in 1999 
and a coalition of seven national and international science academies in 2000 both 
strongly backed GM technology for use in the developing world (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 1999; Royal Society of London et al. 2000). The influential International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a member-institution of the World Bank’s 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), threw its 
support behind the use of modern biotechnologies, in combination with other 
approaches, as a key element of a strategy to revitalise smallholder agriculture 
and increase food production (e.g. IFPRI 1999; Pinstrup-Andersen et al. 1999; 
Pinstrup-Andersen and Schioler 2001). The UN Development Programme’s Human 
Development Report 2001 and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) 
State of Food and Agriculture report for 2004 both broadly endorsed the potential 
of the technology to boost global agriculture, with minor caveats about careful risk 
assessment and appropriate regulation (FAO 2004; UNDP 2001).
Since the late 1990s, biotechnology has frequently been invoked in this way as a 
crucial tool for agricultural development. The mutually supporting arguments of these 
formally neutral and influential bodies appeared to reflect an emerging official and 
scientific consensus that agricultural biotechnology, including GM crops, would be 
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A visitor from another planet eavesdropping on defenders of genetic engineering 
during the summer of 2000 might have come to the conclusion that it was a technology 
developed mainly to feed the world’s poor and malnourished (Charles 2001:262)
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developed in ways that would be ‘pro-poor’, benefiting poor farmers and consumers in 
the developing world. That optimistic consensus was not well-founded. It depended 
on a number of key, unacknowledged and highly questionable assumptions about 
the ways in which the technology would be developed and its likely impacts on 
poverty, hunger and the livelihoods of the poor (Scoones 2002). Among these was 
an implicit assumption that the adoption of effective new agricultural technologies 
would inevitably produce beneficial socio-economic change, within an overarching 
conceptualisation of agricultural development as involving a necessary transition 
from subsistence farming to a commercial, market-oriented agriculture that was 
assumed to be inherently more ‘productive’ and ‘efficient’ (Levidow 2001). In effect, 
without troubling to analyse the complex, context-dependent ways in which new 
agricultural technologies might have an impact on poor people, and the livelihoods 
of poor farmers in particular, poverty was merely invoked as a ‘moral platform’ 
on which a series of assertions about the value of the technology could be made 
(Jansen and Gupta, no date).
Often, a distinction was acknowledged between the ‘first generation’ of GM crops 
actually coming onto the market, which were widely recognised to have been 
developed for commercial farmers in the global North, and a speculative list of 
potential crops and traits that might plausibly benefit small-scale, developing-country 
farmers in the longer term. Too often, however, that important distinction was lost 
behind the headline messages of enthusiastic support for GM crop technology as a 
whole, so that the likely different impacts of different types of crops and traits were 
not explicitly addressed. This conflation allowed the idea to go unchallenged, that 
the ‘first generation’ GM crop technologies themselves might, nevertheless, deliver 
useful benefits for small-scale farmers.
Today, the strength of the consensus position on pro-poor GM crop technology 
in the developing world has softened considerably. This is partly because – in 
agriculture as in pharmaceuticals (Hopkins et al. 2007; Nightingale and Martin 
2004) – the delivery and performance of biotechnology has not lived up to the febrile 
hype of the 1990s. As understandings of the complexity of the factors governing 
heritability and gene expression have deepened, the technical challenges involved 
in genetic modification have proved more difficult than anticipated. Long-predicted 
innovations like pro-vitamin A-enhanced ‘Golden Rice’ and ‘iron rice’ seem as far 
from commercialisation as ever – and for important technical reasons, not just 
because of the onerous regulatory hurdles and consumer opposition that are often 
blamed by their supporters for the delay (Brooks 2008).
More than a decade after the first GM crops were commercialised, global transgenic 
crop acreages, though large, are still limited to just a handful of major commercial 
crops (soya, maize, cotton and canola) and two basic traits (herbicide tolerance 
and insect resistance), and overwhelmingly concentrated in a handful of countries. 
While a number of other GM crops are reported to be in the pipeline, enhanced 
with traits such as disease resistance or drought tolerance, they appear to be 
still some way from commercialisation. In farmers’ fields, transgenic crops have 
delivered merely incremental and contingent benefits for some farmers rather than 
the dramatic advantages for the environment and society that were promised by 
the biotech industry (Benbrook 2004; FOEI 2007, 2008; Raney 2006; Smale et al. 
2006; Vellema 2004).1
In the light of several years of evidence on the cultivation of GM crops in a 
number of developing countries – including China, India, Indonesia, South Africa, 
Argentina and Brazil – the technology has been rather soberly assessed, in a major 
international review, as entailing both opportunities and risks for developing-country 
agriculture and farmers – outcomes which are themselves contingent on a range 
of socio-economic, technical, institutional, agronomic and other factors, not merely 
on the intrinsic properties of the technology itself (IAASTD 2008).
Any student of science and technology in society would have anticipated such a 
conclusion. New technologies have rarely – if ever – been ‘silver bullets’. Where 
is the modern agricultural technology that has produced only unequivocal social 
and environmental benefits, free of corresponding costs? In fact, the value and 
relevance of GM crops for the achievement of developmental goals has been 
widely contested from the start. Even while the enthusiastic official endorsements 
of GM technology were being produced, environmental campaigners, development 
activists and international development analysts and practitioners questioned the 
simplistic assumptions on which the optimistic ‘pro-poor biotechnology’ thesis was 
based (e.g. Altieri and Rosset 1999; Christian Aid 1999; Mayer 2002; Oxfam 1999; 
Scoones 2002).
Clearly, there is a disconnection between the types of GM crop technology that 
have actually been produced and the ‘pro-poor biotechnology’ rhetoric in which 
they have so often been dressed up. That being so, the question arises: why is it 
that GM technology came, nevertheless, to occupy such a central place in global 
policy discussions and public debates about agricultural development? Where 
did the discourse of a ‘pro-poor biotechnology’ come from? This paper postulates 
that one of the key sources of the ‘biotechnology for the poor’ discourse was the 
private sector, through both the public-relations efforts of individual companies and 
through their support for various organisations that work to promote the technology. 
For instance, it has been noted that one of the key reasons why the large US 
transnational agribusiness and biotechnology company, Monsanto, has been such 
a prominent target of anti-GM campaigners is that it has energetically promoted 
a set of claims about the relevance of GM crops to the alleviation of hunger and 
poverty (Charles 2001; Schurman 2004).
The role of the private sector, and Monsanto in particular, in promoting GM crops 
as a pro-poor, developmental technology should therefore be of keen interest to 
students of agricultural development policy and science and technology studies. 
It may hold lessons for both policy makers and technology analysts about how 
1 ‘Biotech’s sparse harvest’, New York Times, 14 February 2006.
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expectations about new technologies are shaped, and the role played by these 
expectations in mobilising both support for and opposition to those new technologies. 
Monsanto is of particular interest because it remains one of the biggest players in 
agricultural biotechnology, with a remarkably dominant position in the market (ETC 
Group 2005; Glover 2007d).
This paper will show how and why Monsanto’s vigorous promotion of the ‘pro-
poor GM crop discourse’ emerged and developed. In particular, it will show that 
the discourse was not merely a public relations device, attached to GM crop 
technology at a late stage of its development in an attempt to smooth its path 
into the market. It goes without saying that it did, of course, serve that purpose; 
but, more fundamentally, the discourse emerged alongside Monsanto’s GM 
technologies themselves, through a twenty-year history in which corporate strategy 
was discussed, rationalised and acted out. The ‘pro-poor GM’ discourse was part 
of the rationalisation that was made, both within and outside the company, to justify 
Monsanto’s investments in biotechnology and to attract the necessary support to 
drive the biotech strategy forward.
The paper will explain how Monsanto’s commercial strategy for agricultural 
biotechnology was shaped during the 1970s and 80s, leading the company 
towards the development of particular types of technology. A key aspect of that 
story concerns the types of expectations that were constructed around the potential 
of the new technology, which included certain visions or narratives about its 
relevance to and value for developing-country agriculture. The paper will argue 
that these expectations and narratives were not merely decorative aspects of the 
story of agricultural biotechnology’s commercial development, but closely linked 
to it.  Hence, the simultaneous production of a technology widely recognised as 
having limited relevance to poverty alleviation alongside a narrative that strongly 
implied it was intended and designed to achieve that goal can be seen as two 
aspects or dimensions of the underlying processes through which the technology 
was produced and shaped.
An important theme of this paper is the way that Monsanto’s GM technology 
strategy was influenced by uncertainty – a key concept in the work of the STEPS 
Centre (Leach et al. 2007). Drawing on insights from the fields of science and 
technology studies (STS) and organisation studies, the paper will suggest that the 
construction of a discourse that depicted GM crops as a pro-poor, developmental 
technology played a role in helping Monsanto’s managers to construct a strategy 
that appeared coherent and rational. That helped them to mobilise and motivate both 
the company’s employees and the investors it needed to drive the strategy forward, 
which served to reduce the uncertainty that is intrinsic to radical technological 
innovation and the associated strategic and organisational change. The point here 
is not that Monsanto’s decision-makers were themselves paralysed by doubt and 
uncertainty, but that they used strategic tools including storytelling and discourse to 
help them manage in a context of uncertainty, so as to try and shape a technological 
and commercial future that would be desirable from the company’s point of view. 
In other words, the paper will argue that the effort to construct GM crops as a 
vital technology for achieving sustainable agriculture, food security and rural 
development was not merely a question of clothing an already existing or naturally 
evolving technological strategy in slick marketing or public relations talk. More 
fundamentally than that, by mobilising support for the company’s biotechnology 
research and development programme, it actually contributed internally to driving 
and shaping Monsanto’s emergent technological and commercial strategy. The 
paper thus aims to help to explain why particular forms of GM crop technology 
emerged, on one hand, and why they were attached to certain symbolic meanings 
and purposes, on the other, even though there was no necessary logical connection 
between the two.
2. THINGS COULD HAVE TURNED OUT DIFFERENTLY
It is instructive to begin by looking back at the ways in which Monsanto personnel 
framed the developmental promise of GM crops in the past.  Shortly before his death 
in 1990, Howard Schneiderman, Monsanto’s senior vice president for research 
and development (R&D) during the 1980s, completed an article for Environmental 
Science and Technology, together with a Monsanto colleague (Schneiderman 
and Carpenter 1990). The article explicitly linked genetic engineering of crops to 
the struggle to feed the world, combat malnourishment and stem the advance of 
environmental degradation, as well as citing a number of specific opportunities to 
help developing country farmers and improve subsistence crops.
The article was thoughtful, reflective and judicious. It did not make any inflated 
claims for GM crops as a silver bullet for developing country agriculture. The 
authors frankly acknowledged that the kinds of solutions appropriate for intensive, 
large-scale farming would not work in the insecure situations facing poor farmers 
in the developing world. The article acknowledged the need for an indigenous, 
sustainable agriculture that preserves soil fertility. It recognised the complexity of 
the development challenge, discussing how, on one hand, the insecurity of poverty 
encourages exploitative land use, while on the other hand there is also the risk that 
economic development itself may ‘generate exploitative terms of production’, thus 
encouraging long-term sustainability to be ‘sacrificed for short-term income’.
The article explicitly acknowledged the socially embedded nature of agricultural 
development, noting that farming on poor soils requires not only skilful farmers 
but supportive government policy. The authors lamented the fact that ‘national 
agricultural policies favor the spread of capitalized, monocultural cash-cropping 
and extensive ranching’. They went on to review some of the potential applications 
of GM crop technology that might be relevant to developing-country agriculture, 
mentioning the potential to introduce traits like disease resistance and improved 
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protein content to subsistence crops like cassava, sorghum, millet and taro. They 
stated that ‘The technology of gene transfer must be developed where it will be 
used, to ensure that it will respond to local conditions and be readily accepted by 
the people’. They mentioned the need for crops that are suitable for intercropping. 
They explicitly acknowledged that GM technology cannot be a ‘quick technology 
fix’, citing the importance of a slew of other interventions – ‘economic and political 
reform, education, land reform, debt relief, an agricultural infrastructure, a strict 
deforestation policy, realistic government food subsidies, family planning, and 
many other things’.
To anyone familiar with Monsanto’s typical approach to GM crop marketing and 
lobbying, such an article seems rather surprising. Contrary to the authors’ call 
for a bottom-up, socially embedded and tailored approach to crop development, 
focused on farmers’ priorities, subsistence crops and mixed cropping systems, 
Monsanto’s current marketing strategy, in the developing as in the developed 
world, revolves around the promotion of standardised, scientifically defined high-
technology packages that centre on a few cash crops, especially transgenic cotton 
and maize and ‘conventional’ hybrid maize. Instead of adapting the technology to 
suit the farmers’ requirements, Monsanto expects smallholder farmers to change, 
using Monsanto’s seed and herbicide inputs to make the transition to a more 
commercially oriented agriculture (Glover 2007d).
How did the (publicly espoused) aspirations of Monsanto managers like Howard 
Schneiderman come to be transformed into a monochromatic corporate focus 
on just a handful of crops, two basic traits and the relentless promotion of a 
standardised package of practices for each crop and trait combination? The 
remainder of this paper will explore how and why these expectations about the 
broad applicability and benefits of GM crop technology came to be separated from 
the specific types of GM crops that were actually developed and commercially 
released by Monsanto, even while the company continued to use the rhetoric of a 
pro-poor GM technology.
3. MONSANTO AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
GM CROP TECHNOLOGY
In 1990, Monsanto was a major chemicals company that had substantial interests 
in artificial sweeteners and food additives, pharmaceuticals, industrial materials 
and agricultural chemicals. The company’s history lay firmly in the chemicals 
industry.  Having started life in 1901 as a manufacturer of saccharin, by the 1970s 
Monsanto was involved in businesses as diverse as oil and gas exploration and 
the production of acetic acid, plastics, synthetic rubber, resins, polystyrene and 
polyethylene, insulation and flame retardant materials, acrylic fibres (including a 
carpet business), silicon wafers for the micro-electronics industry and Astroturf.  In 
1978, agriculture and food processing together accounted for just 17 per cent of the 
company’s sales (Monsanto 1978).
Today, Monsanto is one of the world’s largest seed companies. Although it remains 
the manufacturer of the world’s best-selling herbicide brand, Roundup (glyphosate), 
it has shed its industrial and speciality chemicals division, its sweeteners business 
and even the pharmaceutical subsidiary which it acquired in 1985. It is now an 
agri-business and biotechnology giant that focuses on herbicides and seeds 
and dominates the global market for genetically modified crop traits (ETC Group 
2005; Glover 2007d). The major elements of this dramatic transformation in the 
company’s profile occurred in only about a decade, between the early 1990s and 
the early 2000s.
And yet, when the company had first ventured into the fledgling biotechnology sector 
in the early 1970s, it had done so very tentatively and speculatively.  Monsanto 
first established a small research programme on cell biology in 1975. Over the 
course the next twenty years, Monsanto’s senior executives steadily increased 
the company’s commitment to biotechnological research and development, but 
throughout this time they remained highly unsure about where the investment was 
taking them. Understanding how this initially cautious and tentative exploration 
ultimately led to the radical transformation of the business requires an examination 
of the highly specific and contingent sequence of decisions and processes that 
contributed to it. That examination will help to explain how and why GM crops came 
to be depicted as a technology for the poor.
Against this background of uncertainty, the Monsanto managers’ strategy did 
not spring into existence fully formed. In this regard, it is important for analysts 
of corporate strategy to recognise that a causal conception of strategy – as an 
independent driver of organisational action, like a kind of schematic or blueprint 
designed in advance – is misleading.  More accurately, strategy typically emerges 
from organisational action and interaction and appears as a pattern of activities 
or crystallisation of purpose that only becomes apparent in retrospect (Mintzberg 
1978).  In other words, what we refer to as ‘strategy’ is not so much about coherent 
planning-in-advance to achieve particular goals or targets, but is intimately 
concerned with making sense out of the ‘haze of everyday activities’ in which a 
firm and its employees are involved, thus giving them the appearance of meaning, 
purpose, coherence, continuity and control.  In this light, strategy can be understood 
as a kind of management discourse, designed to convince employees and other 
stakeholders that someone is in charge and is following a coherent plan (Araujo 
and Easton 1996:371).
When elaborating such a discourse, managers typically resort to storylines or 
narratives or invoke vivid metaphors in order to bestow meaning onto what may 
be a very complex and confusing flow of events and activities, in order to inform, 
98
justify and impose decisions in circumstances where more ‘rational’ calculation or 
decision-making is difficult or impossible. Such mechanisms or techniques may thus 
be used to project a degree of certainty forward into an uncertain future (Dunford 
and Jones 2000; Grant, D. et al. 1998; Hill and Levenhagen 1995; Jamison and 
Hård 2003). Strategies are therefore ‘at least as much devices for understanding 
and making sense of where one has been in the past as they are instruments for 
securing the future’ (Coombs 1995:339; see also Brown et al. 2000).
Seen in this light, Monsanto’s entry into the fledgling biotechnology industry will 
be seen to resemble not so much a confident and sure-footed series of strategic 
moves as the accretion or accumulation of a sequence of uncertain, contingent 
steps, which eventually coalesced into a more coherent strategy as a consequence 
of the accumulation itself.  As for the content of the strategy, therefore, one needs 
to look elsewhere to understand how it emerged.
Monsanto’s emergent strategy was informed and shaped by a number of key 
factors. These included apprehensions and expectations about developments in 
the chemicals industry; speculations about the business opportunities and threats 
that would be created by the new technological capabilities emerging from the 
‘life sciences’; a number of key changes or clarifications in legal institutional 
arrangements, which were expected to enable companies to reap financial rewards 
from biotechnological innovations;  and judgements about Monsanto’s current and 
future competitive position. I will discuss each of these briefly below.
MATURATION OF THE CHEMICALS INDUSTRY
During the 1970s, Monsanto’s top decision-makers, in common with other senior 
executives and analysts in their industry, were coming to terms with the perception 
that the chemicals industry was by then a mature, cyclical business, heavily 
dependent on the fluctuating costs of raw materials. In the future, profitability would 
increasingly depend on very basic and unglamorous production capabilities – i.e. 
the ability to drive down costs and make marginal efficiency gains in the production 
of high volumes of chemicals, meeting specified quality thresholds, to achieve low 
profit margins. In agriculture, Monsanto’s scientists were beginning to realise that the 
scope for new approaches to crop-management based on chemistry were limited 
(Resetar et al. 1999). Monsanto executives knew that this would increasingly be the 
kind of sector where products were likely to become increasingly generic, adding 
value would be difficult and a distinct competitive advantage would be hard to attain 
and defend (Monsanto 1981:3). Reflecting this concern about the implications of 
being trapped in a ‘sunset industry’, Howard Schneiderman told Business Week 
magazine, ‘To maintain our markets – and not become another steel industry – we 
must spend on research and development’.2
2 Quoted in Hoover’s company profile, reproduced at http://www.answers.com/topic/monsanto-
company?cat=biz-fin (3/6/08).
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES
During the 1960s and 1970s, Monsanto’s business was increasingly threatened 
by the emergence of the environmental movement and tougher environmental 
regulation. Monsanto had acquired a particularly unenviable reputation in this 
regard, as a major producer of both dioxins and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 
– both persistent environmental pollutants posing serious risks to the environment 
and human health. Law suits and environmental clean-up costs began to cut into 
Monsanto’s bottom line, but more seriously there was a real fear that a serious lapse 
could potentially bankrupt the company (Hertz et al. 2001).3 In response to these 
concerns, Monsanto embarked on a number of waste- and emissions-reduction 
initiatives during the 1980s.  In 1983, for example, the company spent US $25m on 
environmental clean-up costs (Monsanto 1983). Monsanto scored some easy wins in 
the process, but by the early 1990s this ‘end-of-pipe’ approach to pollution-prevention 
and emissions-reduction was running out of steam (Resetar et al. 1999; Sastry et 
al. 2002). Senior executives were becoming convinced that Monsanto’s long-term 
viability would have to depend much less heavily on chemicals (Hertz et al. 2001).
ROUNDUP4
 
Monsanto launched a new herbicide called Roundup (glyphosate) in 1976. The 
chemical rapidly became a runaway commercial success. Within a few years, it 
was being marketed in 115 countries. Sales grew by 20 per cent in 1981 and as 
the company increased production it was soon Monsanto’s most profitable product 
(Monsanto 1981, 1983). Sales volumes continued to grow strongly, years after the 
chemical was first introduced – for example, 25 to 29 per cent per year in the late 
1980s (Monsanto 1988, 1989). It soon became the single most important product 
of Monsanto’s agriculture division, which contributed about 20 per cent of sales 
and around 45 per cent of operating income to the company’s balance sheet each 
year during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Today, glyphosate remains the world’s 
biggest herbicide by volume of sales.
Such a blockbuster product uncorks a fountain of revenue, but also creates an 
uncomfortable dependency on the commercial fortunes of a single brand. Monsanto’s 
management knew that the last of the patents protecting Roundup in the United 
States, its biggest market, would expire in the year 2000, opening the field to potential 
competitors. The company urgently needed a strategy to negotiate this hurdle 
and prolong the useful life of its ‘cash cow’ (Hertz et al. 2001; McDonald 2001).5
3 In fact, liability for PCB contamination at a former Monsanto plant in the southern US state of 
Georgia did eventually lead to the bankruptcy of Monsanto’s industrial chemicals division, Solutia, 
in December 2003 – several years after Monsanto divested the company to shareholders and 26 
years after Monsanto had ceased production of PCBs (Hoover’s company profile reproduced at 
http://www.answers.com/topic/monsanto-company?cat=biz-fin, 3/6/08).
4 Roundup is a registered brand name of the Monsanto Company.
5 ‘A Weed Killer is a Block to Build on’, New York Times 02/08/01.
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6 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
The prospect of using genetic engineering to improve plants, animals and even 
humans had been anticipated long in advance of the 1973 breakthrough by Stanley 
Cohen and Herbert Boyer, who first successfully transferred a section of DNA6 
from one bacterium to another. Both scientists and industrialists quickly began 
to explore commercial applications of the new technology. For example, Herbert 
Boyer founded the company Genentech in 1976 to develop a process for producing 
human insulin from genetically modified E coli bacteria. The company announced 
its breakthrough in 1978 and their insulin went onto the market in 1982 (Bud 1993; 
Wright 1994). At that point, it was still unclear whether a commercially viable 
agricultural biotechnology industry could be created from this new science, but 
Monsanto was just one of many agribusiness companies monitoring developments 
in the field, and preparing to take advantage of any breakthroughs that might 
emerge (Charles 2001; Wright 1994).
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Two key changes in the regulation of intellectual property rights in the United 
States helped to create a much more favourable environment for the commercial 
exploitation of biotechnology, while steering the emerging industry strongly towards 
genetic modification. The most important of these changes came in the form of new 
rulings from the US Supreme Court in two key judgements handed down in 1980 
and 1988, in which the Court allowed transgenic life-forms to be patented. The 
earlier decision, in the famous case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980), unleashed 
a frenzy of investment interest and speculation in the commercial potential of the 
new technology (Bud 1993, 1995; Charles 2001; Wright 1994).
The second key change came in the form of the Bayh—Dole Act of 1980, a piece 
of legislation that enabled universities to own intellectual property that had been 
created through research projects that had been funded by American taxpayers’ 
money in the form of grants from the US federal government. This opened up 
new opportunities for universities to license their intellectual property to the private 
sector for commercial exploitation, and created greater incentives for universities 
and companies to enter into new research collaborations (Bradford 2005).
Each of those factors played a key role in shaping Monsanto’s technical and 
commercial strategy for biotechnology. The impacts can be illustrated using a 
number of key examples. For instance, just two years after Cohen and Boyer’s 
breakthrough in creating a transgenic organism, Monsanto established its cell 
biology research programme. The head of the programme, Ernie Jaworski, made 
himself ‘a fixture at scientific conferences’ (Charles 2001:9) and kept a close eye 
on scientific developments, cultivating relationships with leading microbiologists 
in order to learn about the latest laboratory developments at as early a stage as 
possible. In those days, university scientists were perhaps less keenly aware than 
they are today about the implications of such information-sharing relationships, 
and Monsanto personnel became frequent visitors to the biotechnology labs at 
their local higher education institution, Washington University in St Louis (WUSTL) 
(Charles 2001; see also Wright 1994).
Some of the consequences of the Bayh—Dole Act and the Supreme Court ruling 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty can be seen in the scaling up of Monsanto’s biotech 
research in the early 1980s. In 1979, Monsanto enticed Howard Schneiderman 
from the University of California, Irvine to lead the company’s biotech research 
efforts with the prospect of a US $275m research budget. Within a few months, 
Schneiderman and Jaworski had recruited a team of scientists to drive Monsanto’s 
R&D programme on genetic modification, including three men who were to play 
critically important roles in enabling Monsanto to be among the first to successfully 
transform a plant, in 1982:7 Steve Rogers, Robert (Robb) Fraley and Robert (Rob) 
Horsch. Monsanto opened a state-of-the-art, multi-million dollar molecular biology 
research facility in St Louis in October 1981 (Monsanto 1981). Schneiderman also 
negotiated a major collaborative research agreement with researchers at WUSTL, 
which was first signed in 1982 and renewed in 1987 and 1990. Over the years, this 
collaboration played a critically important role in helping Monsanto build a competitive 
lead in GM crop technology (Charles 2001; Culliton 1990; Hertz et al. 2001).8
The revenues generated by Roundup were vital in enabling Monsanto to boost 
its R&D investments substantially from the mid-1980s onwards. In his first year 
in charge, chief executive Richard (Dick) Mahoney (1984—1995) increased 
agricultural R&D spending to about 8 per cent of sales, and biotechnology was 
a major research priority (Monsanto 1984). This level of spending, which was 
sustained in subsequent years, actually corresponded to an even higher proportion 
of the agriculture division’s sales, since R&D in the chemicals sector remained 
relatively flat, at about three per cent of sales for that division. That rate of spending 
demanded a significant effort by the chief executive to justify it to investors and 
shareholders (Hertz et al. 2001; Resetar et al. 1999).
The disparity between R&D spending on chemicals and biotechnology reflected the 
maturity of the chemicals sector as well as the management’s steadily increasing 
conviction that the shift away from chemistry to biotechnology in agriculture would 
be vital for the company’s future. For instance, Dick Mahoney has been quoted 
as saying ‘Because of parathion [a particularly hazardous insecticide], I don’t ever 
want to be in chemicals again.  And that’s why we’re in biotechnology’ (quoted in 
Charles 2001:25, parenthesis in original). The chemicals division was eventually 
sold off altogether in September 1997. The spin-off indicated a major departure for 
Monsanto, since the chemicals division could be regarded as the historical core 
7 The breakthrough was announced in January 1983. 
8 ‘Betting the Farm on Biotech’, New York Times 10 June 1990.
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of the company, contributing almost US $3.7bn out of nearly US $9bn in annual 
sales in 1995 (Monsanto 1995). But the swelling importance of agriculture was 
clear: despite contributing a significantly smaller (though rapidly growing) share of 
sales, the agriculture division had significantly outperformed the chemicals division 
in terms of operating income every year since 1990, and the gap was increasing.
However, Monsanto’s transformation into a ‘life science’ company, with an agriculture 
strategy increasingly centred around biotechnology, was by no means smooth or 
seamless. Disagreements within the company, between the formerly unchallenged 
chemicals camp and the supporters of the emerging biotechnology, were a source 
of significant tension and conflict over a number of years (Charles 2001; Resetar 
et al. 1999; Sastry et al. 2002:286, n.3). Right through the 1980s, no-one knew 
how to turn the new technology into a successful business, but company scientists 
and executives still persuaded themselves that something useful might emerge. 
Reflecting this uncertainty, Mahoney said, ‘R&D wasn’t part of the strategy;  R&D 
was the strategy…. The science was so intriguing, it was my feeling we ought to 
just keep going’ (quoted in Hertz et al. 2001:11).
The biotechnology advocates came to include most of the key senior executives in the 
company, which helps to explain why their arguments eventually prevailed.  But how 
did they themselves become sufficiently convinced of the arguments that they could 
definitively nail Monsanto’s colours to the mast of biotechnology and contemplate 
jettisoning the company’s chemicals arm altogether? The next sections examine this 
question. To understand how and why Monsanto’s leaders convinced themselves and 
their colleagues and investors to follow the biotech path, it is necessary to examine 
the kinds of rationalisations that they put forward to justify the shift to the ‘life science’ 
model. Exploring these justifications helps to show how, as an intrinsic part of its 
production, biotechnology came to be depicted, by many actors within the company 
as well as by the company as a whole to actors outside it, as a technology that had 
something to do with attaining agricultural sustainability and feeding the world.
4. CONTINUITY COMPETES WITH 
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE
In the early days of its big biotech adventure, Monsanto stressed the basic continuity 
of its biotechnology research programme with its existing competence in chemistry, 
as in this extract from the 1981 annual report:
The Company has also increased its efforts in biotechnology which has emerged as a 
valuable complement to Monsanto’s chemical technology. Biotechnology offers novel 
ways for Monsanto to manipulate molecules. And, manipulating molecules has been 
and continues to be the basis of Monsanto’s chemical businesses (Monsanto 1981:6).
The implication that biotechnology represented a natural evolution of Monsanto’s 
chemicals business no doubt helped soothe the anxieties of chemists within the 
firm. Nevertheless, in the same annual report, the company also stressed the first 
inklings of much more revolutionary possibilities. The document anticipated the 
prospect of inserting valuable new traits into crops, ‘such as insect and disease 
resistance’, and discussed using this technology to ‘feed a hungry world’. Even at 
such an early date, Monsanto was ‘committed to becoming a world leader in this 
field’ (Monsanto 1981:7).
Still, many people inside the company questioned the merits of the biotechnology 
research programme. Tangible results were slow to emerge, and those involved with 
the programme came under increasing pressure to justify their work. They often tried 
to do so by emphasising the long-term strategic potential of GM technology, even 
though the exact dimensions of this potential were uncertain. Robb Fraley, for 
instance, as head of the plant molecular biology research team, is said to have hyped 
the potential of GM crops as a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Monsanto to 
dominate a whole new industry, invoking Microsoft and the market for personal 
computers and software as a powerful analogy (Charles 2001). But the nebulousness 
of such grandiose prospects did not have sufficient traction on its own. 
The more down-to-earth argument that really convinced most colleagues was that 
genetic engineering offered the best prospect of preserving the commercial life of 
Monsanto’s most important product, Roundup. One former Monsanto researcher 
and manager told a revealing story which illustrates this point, showing at the same 
time how people within the company were telling one another stories designed to 
make strategic sense out of their activities in the context of an uncertain future. The 
Monsanto manager recounted how the company’s former CEO, Dick Mahoney, 
once dropped into his laboratory during the 1980s. As the two men discussed the 
ongoing research taking place in the lab, Mahoney asked ‘Why are we doing this?’ 
Looking back, my informant recalled how he had cast around for plausible and 
convincing justifications for the company’s continued investment in his work (and, 
of course, his own continued employment). His first line of argument related to the 
challenges Monsanto would face once the patent expired on Roundup.
Roundup helped shape Monsanto’s technology strategy in the following way. 
Glyphosate began life as a non-selective weedkiller. It had a number of attractive 
properties. While it killed more or less any growing plant, it was considered non-toxic 
to humans or animals and broke down easily in soil through the effects of rain and 
sunshine. This meant farmers could apply Roundup to their fields before planting, 
and sow their crop soon afterwards, often without having to plough the ground first 
(a practice known as ‘conservation tillage’, sometimes ‘minimum tillage’, ‘con-till’ or 
‘no-till’) (Charles 2001). 
9 Interview, Monsanto research scientist, 24/06/05.
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In the early 1980s, Monsanto scientists had noticed that certain bacteria inhabiting 
the waste outflows from the company’s glyphosate manufacturing plants were 
impervious to the chemical. Ernie Jaworski and some of his colleagues reasoned 
that they could dramatically enhance Roundup’s commercial value if they could 
introduce the genes responsible for this resistance to glyphosate into crop plants. 
Farmers would then be able to spray Roundup onto their fields even during the 
growing season, killing unwanted weeds without harming the crop. This would 
significantly expand the market for Roundup and, more importantly, help Monsanto 
to negotiate the expiry of its glyphosate patents, on which such a large slice of 
the company’s income depended. With glyphosate-tolerant GM crops, Monsanto 
would be able to preserve its dominant share of the glyphosate market through a 
marketing strategy that would couple proprietary ‘Roundup Ready’ seeds, priced at 
a level high enough to recoup the company’s substantial investment in R&D, with 
continued sales of Roundup, priced low enough to undercut potential competition 
from manufacturers of generic glyphosate (Charles 2001; McDonald 2001).10
Monsanto’s heritage of agricultural chemicals thus had a profound impact on the first 
generation of products that emerged from its biotechnology research programme. 
This must have been an uncomfortable truth for many of the so-called ‘gene jockeys’ 
in the firm, who regarded GM as a clean, green technology that would fundamentally 
transcend the grubby and harmful chemical paradigm in agriculture. For instance, 
Robb Fraley is said to have exclaimed, ‘“If all we can do [with biotechnology] is 
sell more damned herbicide, we shouldn’t be in this business”’ (Charles 2001:60, 
parenthesis in original). And yet it was Fraley’s own team – under pressure from 
senior management to deliver a commercial product at long last – which set to 
work on the development of the first generation of Roundup Ready11 crops (Charles 
2001). According to one member of Fraley’s team, they eventually zeroed in on the 
Roundup Ready trait because ‘this was the one project that the administration of 
the company understood’ as a commercial proposition (quoted in Charles 2001:67).
Monsanto’s particular institutional features also helped to ensure that insect 
resistance would be the other type of GM crop appearing in the first generation. 
Apart from the fact that the introduction of the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) gene 
proved to be technically straightforward, with the prospect of delivering a significant 
commercial product using a single gene, the fact that Monsanto’s strength lay 
primarily in herbicides rather than insecticides meant that GM insect-resistance 
technology opened up a new market segment without conflicting with or undermining 
any significant ‘pesticide interest’ within the company.
As the above account illustrates, Monsanto’s biotechnology strategy was clearly 
shaped by some basic, down-to-earth features of the company’s particular 
institutional history and contemporary circumstances. These included its existing 
10 Monsanto, ‘The Road to Roundup Ready® Crops’ (http://www.monsanto.com/features/road_to_
roundup.asp, 2/6/08).
11 Roundup Ready is a registered brand name of Monsanto Company.
technologies and technological capabilities, its competitive position, the developing 
trends in the chemicals sector, and the financial pressure to commercialise some 
new products as quickly as possible.  Accordingly, the biotechnology strategy 
evolved around the company’s existing customer base – that is to say, primarily 
large-scale, commercial farmers in the industrialised world – and crop–trait 
combinations that were both technically feasible and commercially viable.
Monsanto’s emerging commercial strategy for biotechnology was therefore firmly 
grounded in the company’s history in the chemicals sector and its existing markets 
among large-scale farmers located mainly in the global North. The Roundup Ready 
commercial model served as a bridge between the company’s chemicals heritage 
and its potential biotech future. One can therefore identify elements of commercial 
and technical continuity as well as discontinuity in what was often seen and portrayed 
as a radical shift from the chemicals paradigm to a biotech paradigm. However, the 
tension between these two alternatives was still not definitively resolved. In the 
early 1990s, Monsanto was still essentially a chemicals company (by volume of 
sales), and GM crops would not arrive on the market until 1995. At that point in the 
story, therefore, basic uncertainty still clouded the company’s future.
That context of uncertainty helps to explain why Monsanto’s managers increasingly 
downplayed the continuity of their approach to biotechnology and energetically 
promoted the company’s thrust into GM technology as a radical break with its past. 
They portrayed GM crop technology as a clean, green and environmentally friendly 
alternative to, rather than continuation of, the chemical-dependent paradigm in 
farming. This amounted to a discursive framing of GM crop technology, but its 
importance was not merely rhetorical, because it helped to shape the commercial-
technical strategy itself. An important side-effect of this discursive framing would be 
to foster a new attention towards, and a sharper focus on, the potential market for 
GM crops among poor farmers in developing countries. The next section examines 
these points in more detail.
5. MANAGING UNCERTAINTY
The future is fundamentally uncertain, of course. Corporate managers can use a 
variety of tools to help them anticipate events and predict outcomes, but the costs 
and benefits of a particular course of action are always more or less unknowable 
in advance. In the absence of reliable prediction, managers’ perceptions about the 
situation in which they find themselves, and what to do, are best regarded as matters 
of judgement rather than calculation. The degree of uncertainty is particularly acute 
in relation to the potential impacts of radical innovation and major technological 
change (Nelson and Winter 1977; Rosenberg 1976). Radical innovation can be 
distinguished from incremental technological development precisely because 
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it involves much greater potential for change and, consequently, high levels of 
uncertainty (MacKenzie 1992, 1996). The types of technologies in question are 
those which have the potential to spark a round of ‘creative destruction’ that will 
precipitate a ‘technological revolution’, launch a new ‘technological trajectory’ or 
overturn an existing ‘technological paradigm’ (Dosi 1982; Dosi et al. 1990; Nelson 
and Winter 1977, 1982; Schumpeter 1987 [1943]).  At the outset of such a dramatic 
re-ordering of conventional patterns, corporate managers are confronted with acute 
uncertainty, in the face of which they still need to make decisions.
Where radical innovation is concerned, it is important for the innovation analyst to 
avoid falling into the trap of thinking that the properties of the future technology are 
self-evident in advance, as if natural, intrinsic or endogenous. This error can result 
from applying some economic approaches to the study of innovation, such as 
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary theory of technological change or Herbert 
Simon’s (1976; Simon et al. 1992) notions of ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘satisficing’ 
behaviour. These approaches represent an advance on classical and neo-classical 
economic approaches, which assume the existence of perfect information, and 
they can also help to address the implications of uncertainty to some degree, by 
shedding light on the routines and rules-of-thumb by which real managers actually 
make decisions in the face of incomplete information (Coombs et al. 1992).
Nevertheless, to varying degrees, they still treat technology as a more or less 
independent variable – that is to say, a defined set of attributes, known and unknown, 
around which corporate managers try to shape their decisions. Unfortunately, one 
cannot depend on the characteristics of an emerging technology or its technological 
system themselves, for guidance on how one should make decisions in relation to 
them. That is because these features are still unknown, precisely because they 
are still emerging and because they will not unfold through some self-contained 
inherent logic but through processes of social shaping. In the 1970s, Monsanto 
executives had no way of knowing what their own company’s commercial GM 
products would look like in twenty years’ time.
In such circumstances, the decisions made and actions instigated by organisational 
managers do not carry their own intrinsic or objective validity. Instead, they acquire 
validation through social processes, through which novel norms of validity and 
common-sense are constructed (Fligstein 2001; Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991; 
Weick 1995; Weick et al. 2005). This may be termed ‘sensemaking’, a social and 
communicative process which typically involves the related process of ‘sensegiving’. 
Sensegiving describes the efforts made by some actors, having made sense of an 
issue or situation to themselves, to project a particular construction of the meaning 
of events in an effort to persuade and enrol a wider group. Sensegiving can therefore 
be seen as particularly characteristic of organisational leaders, when they attempt 
to articulate an organisational strategy and especially when they want to instigate 
major strategic change (Dunford and Jones 2000; Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991; 
Weick 1995). Sensemaking may take the form of a ‘strategy discourse’ (see above; 
Araujo and Easton 1996) or varieties of persuasive narratives or story-telling, which 
create expectations about the future that encourage people to fall into line with 
a particular strategic direction (Deuten and Rip 2000; Michael 2000; Rosenberg 
1976; Sanz-Menéndez and Cabello 2000; Selin 2007; van Lente 2000).
Monsanto’s venture into agricultural biotechnology is a case in point. From the 
standpoint of the 1970s and 80s, the technological and commercial implications of 
biotechnology were open-ended. In the words of Dick Mahoney, ‘[w]e didn’t have 
a good business plan on how to make money out of this stuff’ (quoted in Hertz et 
al. 2001:11); ‘the discussion of how we were going to make money in agricultural 
biotechnology went on into the 1990s’ (quoted in Charles 2001:109). In the context 
of this fundamental uncertainty, as described in the previous section, managers 
and employees within the company were involved in ongoing discussions and 
story-telling in an effort to make sense of what the company was doing and where 
it was going. Through this process, Monsanto’s GM crop technologies actually 
emerged under the influence of a number of key factors and pressures acting 
on the company during the 1970s and 80s, rather than being driven by intrinsic 
characteristics of the technology itself or foreknowledge of what its potential future 
markets might look like. But these factors, being inherently uncertain, were not 
unequivocal facts whose implications spoke for themselves. In order to produce 
their effects on Monsanto’s emergent strategy, they had to be interpreted and 
translated by decision-makers and other influential people in the firm.
Monsanto’s senior executives and managers made sense of the range of technical, 
financial, institutional and competitive features of the landscape through protracted 
processes of discussion and debate. As they became more convinced in their own 
minds, and more confident that they knew which way to lead their company, they 
engaged in sensegiving activities, designed to enrol and persuade their colleagues. 
An important way of convincing staff within the company was to engage in debates 
with key actors outside the firm, making interventions in public debates and 
particular forums where it was hoped to influence the opinions of key stakeholders, 
such as industry observers and journalists, stock analysts and investors. This was 
therefore a dual process, in which the gradually strengthening consensus of people 
within the firm helped to convince important stakeholders outside the firm, and vice 
versa. The next section explores this process in more detail.
6. BUILDING A SOCIO-TECHNICAL NETWORK 
FOR GM CROPS
In order to understand what was going on in this innovation story, it is helpful to 
turn to the insights of sociologists of science and technology into technological 
innovation as a social process (Bijker et al. 1987; Bijker and Law 1992; Callon et 
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al. 1986; Latour 1987; MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). As these scholars have 
argued persuasively, a scientist’s success in constructing a new scientific fact or an 
entrepreneur’s success in bringing into being a new technology depends on their 
success in working at a number of different levels to create and stabilise networks 
of support that will underpin their breakthroughs and promote their adoption and 
commercialisation. In order to build these networks, innovators need to enrol various 
people and assemble disparate assets, including people or ‘relevant social groups’, 
know-how, money and other resources – for example, patents, laboratories, tools 
and equipment, regulations, potential end-users and consumers of technologies, 
and so on (Bijker et al. 1987; Callon 1987, 1991, 1992; Law and Callon 1992). By 
successfully working on these different fronts, the innovator can help to make his or 
her enterprise less risky, by increasing the certainty that it will be successful.  
The ‘scientist–entrepreneur’ (Latour 1987) should thus be envisaged as a 
‘heterogeneous engineer’, ‘extended concurrent engineer’ or ‘system builder’ rather 
than the stereotypical boffin, toiling in isolation in the laboratory or workshop, and 
producing technologies which are only ‘diffused’ in society as part of a separate, 
subsequent process (Deuten et al. 1997; Hughes 1987; Law 1987, 1991). This 
process has been documented in both medical and food biotechnology, where 
companies have been shown to have worked intensively with ‘lead users’, as well 
as lobbying trade organisations, regulatory bodies, legislators and journalists, in 
order to create and shape a favourable market environment for their new products 
(Green 1991, 1992; Miller 1997; Walsh 2002). This work of building support for 
an innovation process entails an effort to attract the attention and investment of a 
heterogeneous group of actors, typically by depicting the particular technology or 
project in question as the path towards a solution to a given problem or a necessary 
step on the way to a desired goal (Callon 1987, 1992; Law and Callon 1992).
How was this task approached in the case of Monsanto’s GM technology? Although 
the company’s technological strategy had been shaped by basic technical and 
commercial considerations, Monsanto’s managers actually embarked on a 
concerted campaign to depict GM crops – and Monsanto as their chief provider 
– as an essential tool for addressing critically important future challenges in hunger, 
environmental sustainability and international development. It is important to note 
that these altruistic goals were not Monsanto’s own. Instead, they served as 
vital human goals, challenges that humanity would necessarily have to address 
in order to survive. Monsanto’s leaders’ target was to ensure that their company, 
and its technologies, would be perceived as indispensable stepping stones on 
the path towards meeting those challenges. In this way, they aimed to convince 
both employees and investors that the company would be a vital player in future 
markets for agricultural technology, and so mobilise their support for the emerging 
corporate strategy. In the paragraphs that follow, I will attempt to explain how this 
came about.
TELLING STORIES ABOUT GM TECHNOLOGY
It was noted above that Monsanto managers sometimes depicted biotechnology as 
a natural continuation, using more modern tools, of the company’s long history in 
‘manipulating molecules’. In a similar way, it has been widely remarked-upon that 
the supporters of GM crop technology have often sought to depict it as a natural 
descendent of ancient techniques in which mankind has used living organisms in 
processes to make useful products, such as yeast in bread-making, or merely a more 
precise and controllable enhancement to conventional methods of selective plant- 
or animal-breeding. These kinds of language were intended to reassure people 
within the company and outside it, by downplaying the novelty and emphasising 
the basic familiarity of genetic engineering.
However, a company does not win new customers and investors by claiming to be 
doing the same old things. In order to justify its heavy spending on R&D, Monsanto’s 
managers needed to stress the remarkable, revolutionary possibilities opened up 
by genetic engineering, emphasising the decline of the old chemicals paradigm and 
sketching the potential advantages of founding a new industrial sector. This helps to 
explain the rhetorical ploys of key managers like Robb Fraley, as he depicted genetic 
engineering as both an opportunity to define the shape of an entire new industry 
and as a clean, green technology that would ensure food security while opening 
the door to a new, more sustainable type of agriculture worldwide (Charles 2001). 
Alongside other senior executives and managers, Fraley conjured up the 
revolutionary potential of biotechnology using dramatic, inspirational rhetoric. In 
their accounts, genetic engineering was not merely a rather humdrum-sounding 
new technique for ‘manipulating molecules’ or a more precise kind of plant-
breeding. It became the key to a much grander vision, which evoked human 
values and principles of profound importance, such as sustainability, environmental 
stewardship and even civilisation itself. For example, Monsanto’s 1984 annual 
report talked about commercialising biotech products ‘for the benefit of mankind’ 
(Monsanto 1984:4). This kind of language was undoubtedly influenced by Howard 
Schneiderman. By all accounts, Schneiderman was a charismatic and persuasive 
advocate for biotechnology. He wanted people to understand that the technology 
was much more than an ingenious new tool. During a speech in 1985, he identified 
biotechnology and genetic engineering as possibly ‘the most significant scientific 
and technological discovery ever made’, one that would in all likelihood outlast 
steam power, electric power generation, nuclear power, fusion power and the 
microprocessor. Through biotechnology, said Schneiderman, ‘Humanity, using 
nature’s own methods, will have learned to persuade her to be a full partner in 
humanity’s major enterprise – civilization’ (Davidson 1985:1282).
Schneiderman typically linked this awe-inspiring vision of biotechnology to the 
needs of developing countries (Gilbert 1994). As discussed above, Schneiderman’s 
co-authored 1990 article for Environmental Science and Technology explicitly 
linked transgenic crop technology to the challenge of feeding the world, tackling 
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hunger and malnutrition and achieving environmental sustainability, and mentioned 
several specific ways in which biotechnology might be used to improve subsistence 
crops and help small-scale farmers (Schneiderman and Carpenter 1990).
Schneiderman’s lieutenants, Rob Horsch and Robb Fraley – both of whom attained 
very senior management roles during the 1990s – also ventured into public 
discussions about genetic modification. Such articles typically invoked the potential 
benefits of GM technology for agriculture in developing countries, often in substantial 
sections of their own. For instance, in a 1993 article, Horsch described in some 
detail Monsanto’s collaboration with the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) in a project to enable 
Kenyan scientists, led by Dr. Florence Wambugu, to introduce a virus-resistance 
gene into sweet potato (Horsch 1993). In a later article, which focused largely 
on technical descriptions of different types of GM crop transformations then in 
development, Horsch illustrated his discussion of work on virus resistance – not a 
major trait of interest to the biotech multinationals – with examples from Mexico and 
Costa Rica on potatoes and squashes, respectively (Horsch 1995).
Fraley’s 1992 article ‘Sustaining the Food Supply’ touted genetic modification as 
a sustainable technology for increasing agricultural productivity and providing 
developing countries with a ‘readily accessible, economically viable means 
of addressing primary food production needs’ in order to feed a growing global 
population (Fraley 1992:40). Fraley – echoing Schneiderman and Carpenter 
(1990) – also conceded that GM technology could not be a ‘quick fix’ for global 
hunger, ‘[n]either is it a substitute for measures such as conventional agricultural 
development, economic and political reform, education, solutions to rural 
landlessness, international debt relief, and population control. But it can help 
ensure a sustainable and adequate food supply’ (Fraley 1992:42).
Fraley also indicated a role for the private sector in projects to transfer technology 
to the developing world, citing another paper in the same journal issue, which 
assessed a number of such projects and actually cast doubt on whether ‘tinkering’ 
with technologies developed in and for the developed world could really make 
a difference in the developing world (Hodgson 1992). The fact that Fraley had 
apparently read and acknowledged these kinds of points is another fascinating 
indication of the kind of cognitive dissonance that was opening up, between the 
kinds of technologies Monsanto was actually developing and the company’s claims 
about their relevance to the needs of farmers in the developing world.
Another charismatic spokesperson for biotechnology, in an even more influential 
position, was Robert (Bob) Shapiro, who took over from Dick Mahoney as 
Monsanto’s CEO in 1995. Shapiro is often described as a ‘visionary’ leader, who 
motivated his colleagues with inspiring, emotional speeches at company retreats 
and staff meetings (Charles 2001; Chataway and Tait 2000).12 He is credited with 
overturning Monsanto’s formerly cautious approach to public dialogue on crop 
and food biotechnology in favour of a much more energetic policy of promoting 
the technology (Vellema 2004). Like Schneiderman, Shapiro saw the potential of 
biotechnology in emotional, almost religious terms. Soon after stepping down as 
Monsanto’s CEO in 1999, he told one interviewer,
‘The thing I would never have guessed about this job is that it gives you a chance to make 
a difference in the world.  When you go home at night and you talk to your family about 
what you’re working on, it isn’t like “Gee, I designed a really cool paper clip today”.  It’s 
about the earth, it’s about the environment, it’s about food.  It’s about health and nutrition. 
These are deep, ancient things for civilization, and they are for people’.  At that point, 
Shapiro stopped talking, because he was fighting back tears… (Specter 2000:64).
12 Interview, Monsanto executive, 15/08/05.
It is important to remember that this kind of rhetoric, though it may appear in a 
public forum, is addressed to internal as well as external audiences. As Shapiro’s 
predecessor Dick Mahoney had recognised, Monsanto’s younger generation of 
employees ‘share the background and values of many members of environmental 
groups; some may well be members themselves’ (quoted in Vorley and Keeney 
1998:211). One Monsanto employee, who joined the company in 1998, related 
that she had been struck by the way that the values of environmentalism and 
sustainability appeared to her to resonate naturally with her new colleagues 
because they were life scientists.13
Under Shapiro’s leadership, Monsanto adopted the now-infamous tagline that 
reflected his grandiose claims: Food u Health u Hope.14 By selling the company’s 
chemicals division and concentrating on agriculture, pharmaceuticals and nutrition 
businesses, Shapiro planned to transform Monsanto into a  ‘life sciences’ company 
working for ‘sustainability’. He said that its goals would be ‘to help people around 
the world lead longer, healthier lives, at costs they can afford, and without continued 
environmental degradation’ (Monsanto 1997:2).
Shapiro’s narration of the sustainability challenge had a millenarian tone. He 
argued that ‘the early 21st century is going to see a struggle between information 
technology and biotechnology on one hand and environmental degradation on the 
other’ (Shapiro 1998:4). Unless humanity could meet the sustainability challenge, he 
foresaw dire scenarios unfolding, ‘…a world of mass migrations and environmental 
degradation on an unimaginable scale. At best, it means the preservation of a few 
islands of privilege and prosperity in a sea of misery and violence’ (Shapiro in 
Magretta 1997:80).
This depiction of the sustainability challenge clearly espoused the need to address 
the needs of the have-nots in the world, as well as the already-haves. Through such 
stark, dramatic depictions, Shapiro sought to place Monsanto symbolically in the 
13 Interview, Monsanto executive, 20/06/05.
14 Interview, Monsanto executive, 15/08/05.
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vanguard of mankind’s struggle towards sustainability and the fight to address the 
global challenges surrounding population growth, hunger, poverty and inequality. It 
was in this aspect of his argument that Shapiro began to symbolically associate his 
company and biotechnology with the challenges of poverty alleviation, international 
development and the needs and hopes of people in developing countries.
The vision of a life science company working for sustainability was undoubtedly an 
inspiring one, but its business implications were hardly clear, as Shapiro candidly 
admitted (Magretta 1997). In an effort to grapple with these implications, in 1996 
Monsanto established seven strategic teams to explore sustainability issues from 
various angles and assess their implications for the company’s future business. 
Two of these teams considered the implications of global water and hunger issues, 
with a view to identifying whether and how Monsanto might develop businesses 
to help address the needs in those areas. Other teams grappled with the practical 
challenge of incorporating concepts such as eco-efficiency, life-cycle analysis and 
full-cost accounting into the company’s operations. By 1998, Monsanto planned 
to develop sustainable development criteria for all of its products and develop the 
necessary tools and plans to incorporate these criteria into its decision-making 
processes (Magretta 1997; Resetar et al. 1999).
In 1997, the work of most of the sustainability teams was folded into a new Sustainable 
Development Business Sector, established to operationalise the sustainability 
strategy (Resetar et al. 1999; Simanis and Hart 2000). The Sustainability Sector 
included a Smallholder Team which was ‘charged with developing products, 
services and partnerships to meet the needs of rural, small-scale farmers in 
developing countries’ (Simanis and Hart 2000:A7). Agricultural genetic modification 
was identified from the start as a major plank in this effort (Resetar et al. 1999).
It is important to observe here that this corporate focus on emerging markets in 
developing countries was not only stimulated by Shapiro’s ideas about sustainability, 
insofar as they entailed certain logical implications with regard to poverty, hunger 
and development. Monsanto’s engagement with the problems of developing-
country agriculture also emerged organically from the conjunction of its efforts to 
promote Roundup in the developing world, which typically involved the promotion of 
the chemical as part of a conservation tillage technology package, and the desires 
of a number of individual company employees to use their technical knowledge and 
Monsanto’s resources for the benefit of resource-poor farmers.
It is often not appreciated that Monsanto has been one of the most energetic 
promoters of conservation tillage, in a particular form that binds the concept tightly 
to Roundup. According to Resetar et al. (1999), it was only some time after farmers 
had started using Roundup in 1976 that Monsanto realised the chemical could be 
used advantageously in con-till or no-till farming systems. Since then, Monsanto 
scientists and technicians have been among the leading researchers on the 
concept and the company has energetically promoted the concept to farmers and 
agronomists, in farmers’ fields and agricultural conferences, beginning in the USA 
and Canada in the early 1980s (Hall 1998; Howe and Graham 1982; Soteres 1982) 
but rapidly spreading their message to Brazil (Landers 2000, 2001; Resende 1985) 
and sub-Saharan African countries including South Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya 
(Chedzey 1986; Collins 1986; Kemboi 1986; Meyer 1986). The company continued 
to promote the concept at conferences in countries such as Spain, the Philippines 
and India during the 1990s (Baria 1996; Schumacher 1997; Vilamajó 1995).
Although some of these examples examined the potential of no-till systems in rainfed 
agriculture, the company’s promotion of the concept in the 1980s was addressed 
primarily towards the larger-scale farmers who could afford the necessary inputs. 
However, beginning in the early 1990s, Monsanto began to provide financial and 
technical backing to projects run by the NGOs Sasakawa Global 2000 (SG2000) 
and Winrock International to promote no-till methods to resource poor, small-scale 
farmers in Brazil and several sub-Saharan African countries (Ekboir 2003; Ekboir 
et al. 2002; Findlay and Hutchinson 1999; Fowler and Rockstrom 2001; Ito et al. 
2007).15 Monsanto’s support for these kinds of initiative had been prompted partly 
by voluntary efforts on the part of a number of its own employees, located mainly 
in the company’s African businesses or with professional experience in developing 
countries, who wanted to use their technical expertise and Monsanto’s resources 
in non-commercial philanthropic projects to help poor farmers.16
One senior executive referred to the promotion of con-till to small farmers, using 
special small packages of Roundup herbicide, as the first practical translation of 
a corporate target known as the ‘developing country (or countries) goal’.17 This 
goal, to ‘transform agriculture’ in developing countries, was adopted by Monsanto’s 
agriculture division in the early 1990s, when Robert Shapiro was its managing 
director.18 That goal was partly a commercial objective, but it also contained within it 
a notion of ‘making a contribution to transferring modern farming technology to under-
privileged small-scale farmers’ (Findlay and Hutchinson 1999:52). This formulation 
is a classic example of the way that Monsanto has consistently elided the distinction 
between raw commercial self-interest and philanthropic do-gooding (Glover 2007b).
This brief digression serves to illustrate that the flurry of activity around the issue 
of sustainability, launched by Shapiro when he became Monsanto’s CEO in 
April 1995, grew from a longer history in which the company had begun to pay 
closer attention to developing countries and to experiment with ways of serving 
smallholder markets. Nevertheless, even while all this work was going on, Shapiro 
candidly admitted that he didn’t know how helping people to break out of poverty 
could be made to work as a business venture:
15 Much earlier, the British agri-chemicals firm ICI (later Zeneca, AstraZeneca and Syngenta) had 
helped to launch the Brazilian no-till project, which began in the late 1970s (Ekboir 2003).
16 Interview, former Monsanto executive, by telephone, 11/07/08.
17 Interview, Monsanto executive, St Louis, 20/06/05.
18 Interview, Monsanto executive, St Louis, 20/06/05.  My source could not recall the exact terms of 
the developing country goal, including the number of countries targeted for agricultural ‘transformation’.
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‘It’s difficult, in the short term, figuring out how I am going to make money 
dealing with people who don’t have money,’ he said at one point.  ‘But in 
practice, the development of agriculture at a village level is something that could 
make an enormous amount of business sense over time’ (Charles 2001:271).
Confessing to this degree of uncertainty is striking in view of Monsanto’s status as 
a publicly listed company. The strenuous efforts by Shapiro and his colleagues to 
sell the life science and sustainability vision indicate the challenge, as well as the 
importance, of persuading investors and shareholders to back such an uncertain 
venture. Transforming the company from a diversified chemicals business into a 
life science company involved a new configuration of material assets and technical 
capabilities, which in turn required a determined effort to assemble a new network 
of support, both externally (especially among investors) as well as internally. 
Accordingly, Monsanto vigorously promoted the new vision through its in-house 
magazine19 and annual reports (especially the 1997 report), as well as various public 
channels. For instance, a number of articles were published under Shapiro’s name, 
in addition to magazine interviews and profiles of the CEO (Magretta 1997; Scott 
1996; Shapiro 1998, 1999). Reporters from business newspapers and magazines 
began to discuss the changes under way at Monsanto, with varying degrees of 
admiration (Grant, L. 1997; Jaffe 1998; Lenzner and Upbin 1997; Melcher 1998; 
The Economist 1997; Walmac 1997).
WHAT CHANGED?
What difference did all of this activity and rhetoric make to Monsanto’s activities? It is 
worth reiterating at this point that, as suggested by innovation analysts, Monsanto’s 
managers’ purpose in invoking the broad goal of global sustainability was not a 
question of establishing that goal as a target for the company itself. Their aim was 
to find ways of making viable businesses out of the opportunities that they expected 
to arise from the sustainability challenge. Therefore, sustainability was invoked as 
a way to convince the company’s key stakeholders that Monsanto was on top of 
developments that were about to unfold, and that the products and services it was 
gearing up to produce would make the company an indispensable player in the 
years to come – a safe bet for both financial investors and employees.
As discussed earlier, Monsanto’s basic technology strategy was already firmly 
entrenched, having been shaped by various technical and institutional changes as 
well as the company’s existing technologies and market strengths. Although many 
people within the company came to see Monsanto as a pioneering life science 
business whose products contributed to sustainable development, food security 
and poverty alleviation, all that had really changed was essentially a difference 
19 An article entitled ‘Fields of Promise:  Monsanto and the Development of Agricultural 
Biotechnology’, written by independent consultant Karen Keeler Rogers, was published in 
Monsanto Magazine in two parts at the end of 1996 and beginning of 1997.
of perspective – a new way of looking at the same basic products rather than a 
transformation in the nature of the products themselves (Sastry et al. 2002; van 
Gelder 1999; Vellema 2004).20 As one of the company’s critics put it:
‘As far as I can see, there has been little or no change. Whatever plans and 
products they had in their pipelines came right on through.  I don‘t know of any 
new products that came about because of any environmental commitment, and 
the old underlying divisional culture of ramming products into the marketplace 
without consulting a broader stakeholder community about effects, values, 
science, and other potential concerns – with the arrogance that entails – 
remains intact.  What exists now is a company without clear leadership, with 
… a product line that is truly unnerving’ (Paul Hawken in van Gelder 1999).
As Vorley and Keeney (1998:208) have argued, drawing on the case of Monsanto 
among others, ‘the top-down visions foisted on employees by born-again CEO 
environmentalists’ typically fail to stimulate the fundamental redesign that is needed 
in order to transform a company into a sustainable business.
Nevertheless, at first, nothing happened to disabuse Monsanto staff from the belief 
that they were on the right track. Investors also seemed to buy into the life science 
model, and GM crop technology enjoyed a successful commercial launch in the 
USA in 1995 and 1996.21 The enthusiasm of both farmers and Wall Street appeared 
to endorse Shapiro’s strategy, reinforcing employees’ confidence in their company’s 
identity as a successful, sustainable business. However, during 1998 and 1999 this 
self-assurance was to be seriously challenged by a backlash against biotechnology. 
The backlash precipitated a serious crisis for Monsanto, and became the catalytic 
moment that sparked major public debates about agricultural biotechnology in 
development, helping to establish it as one of the key axes of public disquiet about 
the socio-political and ethical implications of biotechnology.
7. THE ANTI-GM BACKLASH:  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BECOME MORE IMPORTANT
Europe was expected to be the focus of Monsanto’s next major market-expansion 
thrust. There, however, Monsanto’s plans ran into serious problems in the autumn 
of 1998. Various structural and contingent features of the European landscape 
made it a particularly ripe location for a blacklash against GM crops that had been 
21 Interview, Monsanto executive, 20/06/05. 
22 ‘Seed Money:  Huge Biotech Harvest is a Boon for Farmers – and for Monsanto’, Wall Street 
Journal, 24/10/1996.
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brewing for twenty years or more (Schurman 2004; Schurman and Munro 2006). 
Anti-GM activists there had been campaigning against the technology since the 
first attempt to import GM grain into European ports in 1996, and momentum had 
been building through 1997. In the autumn of 1998, an ill-conceived Monsanto 
advertising campaign helped to trigger a widespread backlash by European 
consumers. The campaign explicitly asserted that ‘worrying about starving future 
generations won’t feed the world. Food biotechnology will’ (quoted in Charles 
2001:222). Within days, European food retailers were pulling foods containing GM 
ingredients from their shelves. Within months, the European Union had imposed 
a de facto moratorium on further approvals of GM crops. Surveying the scene, in 
the summer of 1999, analysts at Deutsche Bank issued a market analysis that 
declared ‘GMOs are Dead’ (Charles 2001; Schurman 2004; Schurman and Munro 
2006; Simanis and Hart 2000).22
From a financial point of view, the crisis had a disastrous impact on perceptions of 
Monsanto’s ability to realise profits from its large investments in biotechnological 
research and development, as well as service the huge debt the company had 
taken on (Vellema 2004). In other words, the emergency threatened to seriously 
undermine the socio-technical network Monsanto’s managers had been trying 
to assemble behind its life sciences strategy. Moreover, the crisis also revealed 
the inadequate scope of the network, which left out important stakeholder groups 
that had the power to disrupt the company’s plans. The crisis suddenly revealed 
the opposition of stakeholders whose interests Monsanto’s leadership had fatally 
misconstrued, misjudged or failed to anticipate. As they built the network of support 
that would help them to manage and reduce the uncertainty surrounding the future 
of biotechnology, Monsanto’s senior executives had relied on a set of mistaken 
assumptions about the interests and values of consumers and almost entirely 
overlooked or seriously underestimated the potential objections of other important 
groups, such as environmental activists and development practitioners and 
campaigners.  In other words, the company’s leaders had proceeded as if innovation 
were a unilinear process in which technologies would flow unproblematically from 
the company’s labs to a compliant public.
Part of Monsanto’s problem was that the ‘first generation’ GM crop technologies 
were designed to help farmers manage their operations and did not offer a direct 
benefit to end-consumers (Tait and Chataway 2005). That helps to explain why 
Monsanto’s public relations managers resorted to an alternative set of claims, in 
which they invoked the potential benefits of (future) GM crops for poor farmers 
and consumers in the developing world – a potentially powerful moral claim that 
has consistently been used to evoke a supposed ethical responsibility, on the 
part of wealthy consumers in regions such as Europe, not to impede the urgent 
development and commercialisation of GM crops in the global South.
22 The report may be found as an appendix to the same analysts’ subsequent report on DuPont 
(Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown 1999)
Struggles over the interests of developing country farmers were at the very centre 
of the crisis facing Monsanto. Provoked by the company’s claims about the role 
of its technologies in feeding the world, opponents of GM crops latched onto 
Monsanto’s announcement, in May 1998, that it planned to acquire the Delta & 
Pine Land Company. Shortly before the announcement, Delta & Pine, together 
with the US Department of Agriculture, had been awarded a US patent on a sterile-
seed ‘genetic use restriction technology’ (GURT), that would render genetically 
modified plants infertile. Anti-GM activists from the Rural Advancement Foundation 
International (RAFI)23 dubbed the technology ‘the terminator’, raising the alarm 
over the possibility that it could be used to prevent farmers from saving seeds and 
thus make them dependent on biotechnology and seed companies (Charles 2001; 
Schurman and Munro 2006; Simanis and Hart 2000; Whipple 1999).
Finding themselves depicted as a big, evil corporation intent on controlling and 
impoverishing farmers was a profoundly unsettling experience for Monsanto staff, 
who had become used to thinking of their company as being engaged in the 
sustainability business. It is important to note the degree to which many people within 
Monsanto had evidently internalised the corporate narrative about biotechnology 
and sustainability. Indeed, unless one takes this factor into account, it is hard to 
understand why Monsanto’s leadership – ignoring the well-informed advice of both 
their European staff and competitors (Schurman 2004; Tait and Chataway 2005) 
– stumbled so blindly into the firestorm of controversy that engulfed the company 
when it sought to introduce GM crops to the European market. The reactions of 
company officials displayed genuine shock and surprise (Glover 2007d; Tait and 
Chataway 2005). Weick (1995) identifies this kind of shock, which destabilises an 
established way of seeing the world, as an ‘occasion for sensemaking’ – a time 
when it becomes necessary to bring contrary signals or perceptions back into line 
with one another. But this was about more than merely soothing Monsanto people’s 
self-image; Monsanto urgently needed to repair its commercialisation strategy for 
biotechnology.
In particular, with markets in Europe closed indefinitely, Monsanto needed to turn 
urgently to other markets in order to begin realising a bigger return on the huge 
investments that had been ploughed into biotechnology over more than two decades. 
Developing countries were one of the obvious places to turn. Between 1995 and 
1999, Robert Shapiro had led Monsanto on a US $8–9bn spending spree to buy, or 
acquire interests in, biotechnology and seed companies around the world.  Shapiro 
and his colleagues had recognised that gaining control of seed companies would 
be crucial in order to deliver Monsanto’s GM traits to farmers. The acquisitions 
included a number that had transformed Monsanto, almost overnight, into a major 
player in seed markets in the global South – notably the purchase of Cargill’s 
international seeds business, the Brazilian seed firm Sementes Agroceres and a 
stake in the Maharashtra Hybrid Seed Company (Mahyco), in India. Monsanto’s 
23 RAFI’s name was changed to the ETC [Erosion, Technology and Concentration] Group in 2001.  
See www.etcgroup.org (01/08/08).
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plans for commercialising GM crops in certain key developing countries, such as 
China, India and South Africa, were already in train, but these planned expansions 
became all the more important in the light of the difficulties the company was facing 
in Europe. As an illustration of this point, it is worth noting that Shapiro’s successor as 
CEO, on taking the helm in February 2000, laid down as an urgent priority GM crop 
commercialisation in three international markets, two of which were in the developing 
world (Brazil and India – the third was the European Union) (Monsanto 2000a).
Monsanto’s activities in the global South were a key trigger of many anti-GM 
campaigners’ anxiety. They alleged that, by establishing a market for its GM crops 
in major producer countries in the global South, Monsanto hoped to make the 
technology a fait accompli, thus rendering impotent the opposition of consumers 
to transgenic crops in Europe and elsewhere. For their part, however, Monsanto’s 
senior executives and their allies remained convinced that they had a positive story 
to tell about the benefits of GM crop technology for poor farmers and consumers in 
the developing world. One of the consequences of Monsanto’s setback, therefore, 
was to stimulate a redoubling of the company’s efforts to promote these positive 
stories at every opportunity. This would be vital if the company were to reinvigorate 
the network of supporters it needed to drive its biotechnology strategy.  Investors 
were key; their confidence in Monsanto had been shaken by consumers’ and 
activists’ unwillingness to approve the company’s products. Hence, in order to 
bring the investors back on board, it was important to try and persuade consumers 
and development activists – and mediators of public opinion and debate such as 
journalists – to drop their opposition.
Monsanto’s leadership took a number of key steps. Following an intervention by 
the then-president of the Rockefeller Foundation, Sir Gordon Conway, Monsanto 
publicly renounced the terminator technology.24 (In any case, Monsanto’s plans 
to acquire Delta & Pine foundered in the face of an anti-trust investigation by US 
regulators.25 By then, however, the damage to Monsanto’s image was already 
done; even today, many people believe that Monsanto’s GM seeds contain the 
terminator gene.) Then, in November 2000, the company publicly announced the 
adoption of a new corporate code of conduct, the New Monsanto Pledge, together 
with the creation of the Technology Cooperation and Smallholder Programmes 
(Monsanto 2000d).
The New Monsanto Pledge was a revamped version of an existing set of 
environmental commitments that Monsanto had adopted in the early 1980s 
(Monsanto 2000d; Sastry et al. 2002). It committed the company to a ‘new way 
of doing business’. One of the key commitments was ‘to bring the knowledge and 
advantages of all forms of agriculture to resource poor farmers in the developing 
world to help improve food security and protect the environment’ (Monsanto 2000d).
24 ‘Monsanto issues pledge on sterile seeds’, Financial Times, 5/10/99.
25 Monsanto went on to acquire Delta & Pine in 2006.
The Technology Cooperation Programme was an initiative to licence select pieces 
of Monsanto’s intellectual property to external researchers for non-commercial 
applications, particularly public-good research and applications relevant to the 
developing world. It built on the company’s previous experience with the virus-
resistant sweet potato project in Kenya (see above).  Examples of the programme’s 
activities include Monsanto’s deal, concluded in April 2000, to share its working 
draft of the rice genome with public-sector researchers from the International Rice 
Genome Sequencing Project; and its decisions to share proprietary technology 
with scientists working on the development of beta carotene-enhanced ‘Golden 
Rice’ and ‘Golden Mustard’ a few months later (Monsanto 2000b, c, e).
The Smallholder Programme brought together, into a coherent corporate 
programme, a number of individual projects that had been initiated on a piecemeal 
and ad hoc basis, often on a voluntary footing, by different Monsanto business 
units in various parts of the world, as well as the company’s support for the con-till 
projects implemented by SG2000 and Winrock International that were described 
above. The programme was supposedly designed to provide a package of 
agricultural extension support and advice to resource-poor farmers in a selection of 
developing countries. It was used by Monsanto to help develop new markets among 
smallholders, promote particular Monsanto technology packages and products, 
encourage farmers to make the transition from subsistence farming to commercial 
agriculture, and generate evidence to show that GM technology was suitable and 
appropriate for small-scale farmers in the developing world (Glover 2007a,c).
On top of these initiatives, in 2000 Monsanto also earmarked US $6m to fund 
research into the economic, agronomic and environmental impacts of GM crops. The 
supported researchers were encouraged to ‘make the research findings available 
to the public through peer-reviewed scientific publications and presentations at 
conferences and public meetings’ (Monsanto 2001:13). According to Monsanto, 
the initiative generated 82 presentations and 44 publications in 2001 alone and 
would fund more than 90 different projects in Asia, Europe and the Americas 
by the end of 2002 (Monsanto 2001). One example cited by the company was 
a paper presented by researchers from Reading University (UK) at a prominent 
conference in Johannesburg, South Africa in September 2001 (Ismael et al. 
2001).26 Monsanto’s funding programme was expected to continue ‘through 2002 
and beyond’ (Monsanto 2001:13).27
26 The cited paper reported yield increases and economic advantages for small-scale Bt cotton-
adopters in South Africa on the basis of research carried out during two growing seasons.  
Subsequently, the same team of authors has extended its research to India and to Bt maize.  Their 
findings are generally presented as favouring the argument that Bt crops are beneficial for poor 
farmers.  See http://www.reading.ac.uk/apd/staff/r-m-bennett.asp (10/10/08) for an extensive 
selection of their papers.
26 Monsanto funded research undertaken by Prof. Richard Bennett of Reading University’s School 
of Agriculture, Policy and Development on the livelihood impacts of Bt cotton and maize in South 
Africa during 2005/06 (http://www.reading.ac.uk/apd/staff/r-m-bennett.asp, 10/10/08).
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A question not directly addressed by this paper is what may have been the 
connection between Monsanto’s long-standing claims about the relevance of GM 
crop technology to the needs and problems of developing-country agriculture, 
on one hand, and the ways in which these claims were echoed in the ‘pro-poor 
biotechnology’ position that was put forward by international organizations and 
scientific bodies on the other.  What is clear is that Monsanto, both independently 
and in concert with other actors, engaged in a well-funded effort to publicise its 
developing-world activities and to promote GM crops as a safe, environmentally 
friendly technology that was relevant to international development, food security 
and smallholder farming. In numerous glossy publications, slick websites and 
public statements, the company sought to create positive associations between 
GM crops and agriculture in the developing world (Glover 2007b, c).
Monsanto also joined other major agribusiness companies in supporting third-
party organisations, such as the Biotechnology Industry Organisation (BIO), the 
International Food Information Council (IFIC), the Agricultural Biotechnology 
Council (ABC), the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech 
Applications (ISAAA) and others, which have vigorously promoted GM crops as 
a safe, environmentally sustainable and appropriate technology for development. 
Some of these organisations have resorted to Machiavellian tactics to influence 
media reporting and manipulate public opinion, even going so far as to fabricate 
artificial demonstrations of support for GM crop technologies by poor (and not-so-
poor) farmers in India and South Africa (de Grassi 2003; Hisano 2005; Matthews 
2003).28 It is at least plausible that these kinds of activities have had a strong 
influence on journalists, policy-makers and opinion-formers.
For a sustained period in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Monsanto’s efforts to 
frame GM crops as a technology that was centrally concerned with development 
appeared, arguably, to be paying off. The supposed moral imperative to facilitate 
and encourage the commercialisation of GM crops in developing countries has 
been invoked relentlessly in the biotech industry’s efforts to browbeat European 
consumers and decision-makers into accepting the technology. While consumers’ 
and environmentalists’ attitudes remained hostile and even seemed to harden 
against GM crops, the biotech lobby’s message had much more traction with 
influential politicians, policy-makers, scientific bodies and official development 
organisations.
The prominence of the issues of poverty, hunger and development in debates 
about genetic modification technology probably also owes something to the fact 
that these claims by the biotech industry provoked such ire among development 
activists and environmentalists. Thus, through a clash between public relations 
hype by biotechnology’s supporters and angry denouncement by its opponents, 
the images of smallholder farmers and poor consumers in developing countries 
28 ‘Monsanto’s “shock and awe”’, AgBioIndia Bulletin, 17 April 2003, reproduced in GENET News, 
17 April 2003 (http://www.gene.ch/genet/2003/Apr/msg00057.html, 5 June 2008).
– as victims of hunger, as technological entrepreneurs and so on – assumed a 
weighty symbolic importance in global disputes about the merits and risks of GM 
crops (Bernauer and Aerni 2007).
8. CONCLUSIONS
Many people assume that Monsanto’s energetic promotion of GM crops as a 
technology to benefit the poor and boost food production is no more than a set of 
public relations claims that stem from the company’s efforts to fight back against 
the anti-GM backlash that erupted in the late 1990s. Such an assumption is 
sociologically implausible, if it is taken to imply that the rhetoric of a pro-poor GM 
technology sprang spontaneously into existence in the late 1990s, more or less 
fully formed, from a vacuum.
This paper has argued that the rhetoric of a pro-poor GM technology actually has 
at least some of its roots in the process by which Monsanto effected its eventual 
transformation from a chemicals and pharmaceuticals conglomerate into an 
agricultural biotechnology business. In other words, the rhetoric has a much longer 
history than is sometimes appreciated, and it emerged alongside the development 
of Monsanto’s GM technology itself. This paper has argued that the rhetoric that 
presented GM technology as a sustainable, environmentally friendly and pro-poor 
technology emerged from the same set of underlying corporate processes that 
produced the GM technologies themselves.
Furthermore, the paper has argued that the formulation of the pro-poor GM rhetoric 
actually played a role in the process of shaping Monsanto’s commercial and 
technological strategy. This was partly because it clothed a situation of technology 
development that was fundamentally uncertain in the appearance of greater 
certainty, by creating a storyline which gave a sense of purpose and direction 
towards a particular goal which, it was argued, would prove to be technically and 
commercially viable. The rhetoric thus conjured up a set of expectations about the 
technology, which assisted the coalescence of an emerging corporate strategy by 
encouraging both Monsanto employees and external actors, especially financial 
investors, to fall in line with it. It thus helped Monsanto’s senior managers to 
negotiate their way from a starting point of profound uncertainty to a place where 
they could feel more confident in their directions and goals and, indeed, make 
those outcomes more likely to come about.
This paper has shown that Monsanto’s attention to developing country agriculture, 
and its rhetoric about the relevance of modern farming technologies – including 
biotechnology – to the needs of developing countries, pre-dates the late-1990s 
backlash against biotechnology by many years (as indeed the backlash itself 
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was rooted in a much longer history of developing opposition to the technology 
(Schurman and Munro 2006)). The company’s representation of GM technology 
as a sustainable, environmentally friendly and pro-poor technology that would feed 
the world first appeared in company documents at least as long ago as the early 
1980s. Over the next twenty years, these kinds of ideas were further elaborated 
and promoted within the firm and outside, especially by key individuals like Howard 
Schneiderman and Robb Fraley. Over the same period of time, Monsanto also 
became engaged in the promotion of conservation tillage in the developing world, 
which extended, by about 1990, on a quasi-philanthropic footing, to include a focus 
on resource-poor farmers in the developing world.
During the same period, Monsanto was also engaged in a long drawn-out process 
of exploring the implications of biotechnology for its business model. Profoundly 
influenced by the company’s early experiences with con-till, by the mid-1980s the 
Roundup Ready commercial and technical model became cemented into company 
strategy, but the model did not become a commercial reality until a decade later. 
Meanwhile, the ‘developing countries goal’ had been adopted, which began to focus 
the company’s attention more squarely on the commercial opportunities opening 
up in the developing world. Thus, the commercial-technical strategy and the focus 
on developing-country agriculture were developing in tandem.
However, the ‘pro-poor GM’ rhetoric and the commercial biotechnology strategy 
were evolving somewhat independently of one another. The GM crop technology 
strategy was shaped during the 1970s, 80s and 90s by various technical, financial, 
competitive and industrial trends. Among the most important considerations was 
the need to sustain the profitable life of Roundup. These factors had little to do with 
the needs and priorities of smallholders. Instead, the first generation of GM crop 
technologies were being shaped around the needs of Monsanto’s core markets 
among large-scale farmers, primarily in the industrialised world.
Nevertheless, the elaboration of a storyline about global agricultural development, 
sustainability and the challenge of global food security was important in the 
development of the company’s technical and commercial strategies, because it 
helped Monsanto’s senior management to mobilise the resources they needed to 
drive their technology strategy. It performed this role by helping them to articulate a 
storyline or narrative that linked the company’s history in chemicals, via a present in 
which careful investments were being made in biotechnology, to a cleaner, greener 
future in which Monsanto’s products would be vital, in-demand tools for delivering 
sustainable, productive agriculture.
The content of the narrative helped to place developing country agriculture and 
the needs of smallholder farmers near the centre of Monsanto’s business strategy, 
so that they became key symbolic stakeholders in the development of modern 
biotechnology and GM crops. This occurred in two ways. First, the vision of a life 
science company harnessing revolutionary science for the attainment of important 
human goals, articulated most clearly by Robert Shapiro, implicitly involved poor 
farmers and consumers of the developing world as key stakeholders in agricultural 
biotechnology. Second, the GM crop moratorium in the European Union meant that 
developing country markets became more important from a commercial point of 
view, but in addition the anti-biotech backlash also challenged Monsanto to justify 
its claims about the relevance and value of GM crops in the developing world. The 
latter imperative gave rise to a strenuous effort to generate and promote good 
news stories around GM crops in developing countries, as this paper has shown.
In summary, this paper has shown that, although there was and remains a logical 
disconnection between the types of GM crops that have actually been commercialised 
by Monsanto, on one hand, and the company’s rhetoric surrounding GM crops as 
a technology for the poor, on the other, the production of both the technology and 
the rhetoric can be seen to have been produced in tandem, driven and shaped 
by the mixture of commercial, institutional and technical considerations that were 
influencing the development of the company’s strategy over many years.
35
9. REFERENCES
Altieri, M. and Rosset, P. (1999) ‘Ten reasons why biotechnology will not 
ensure food security, protect the environment, and reduce poverty in the developing 
world’, AgBioForum 2.3&4: 155-162.
Araujo, L. and Easton, G. (1996) ‘Strategy: Where is the Pattern?’ 
Organization 3.3: 361-383.
Baria, A. (1996) ‘Development and commercialisation of “tipid-saka” 
technology in major agricultural crops of the Philippines’, Philippine Journal of Crop 
Science 21.1, July: 35.
Benbrook, C. (2004) Genetically Engineered Crops and Pesticide Use in the 
United  States: The First  Nine  Years, Bio Tech  Info  Net  Technical  Paper  7 http://www.bfn.
eu/fileadmin/MDB/documents/InfoNet-2004_Pesticide_Use_USA.pdf (31/07/08).
Bernauer, T. and Aerni, P. (2007) ‘Competition for Public Trust: Causes and 
Consequences of Extending the Transatlantic Biotech Conflict to Developing 
Countries’, in R. Falkner (ed.) The International Politics of Genetically Modified 
Food: Diplomacy, Trade and Law, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; 138-154.
Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P. and Pinch, T. J. (eds) (1987) The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and 
History of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Bijker, W. E. and Law, J. (eds) (1992) Shaping Technology/ Building Society: 
Studies in sociotechnical change, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Bradford, T. C. (2005) ‘Biotechnology Industry in the USA: Convergence of 
Scientific, Technical and Legal Practices’, Tailoring Biotechnologies 1.2: 121-132.
Brooks, S. (2008) ‘Global Science, Public Goods? Tracing International 
Science Policy Processes in Rice Biofortification’, unpublished DPhil thesis, July, 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
Brown, N., Rappert, B. and Webster, A. (eds) (2000) Contested Futures: A 
sociology of prospective techno-science, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bud, R. (1993) The Uses of Life. A History of Biotechnology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
u (1995) ‘In the engine of industry: regulators of biotechnology, 1970-
86’, in M. Bauer (ed.) Resistance to new technology: nuclear power, information 
technology and biotechnology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 293-310.
Callon, M. (1987) ‘Society in the Making: The Study of Technology as a Tool 
for Sociological Analysis’, in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes and T. J. Pinch (eds) The 
Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and 
History of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 83-103.
u (1991) ‘Techno-economic networks and irreversibility’, in J. Law (ed.) A 
Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination, London: 
Routledge; 132-161.
u (1992) ‘The dynamics of techno-economic networks’, in R. Coombs, 
P. Saviotti and V. Walsh (eds) Technological Change and Company Strategies, 
London: Academic Press; 72-102.
Callon, M., Law, J. and Rip, A. (1986) Mapping the Dynamics of Science 
and Technology, London: Macmillan.
Charles, D. (2001) Lords of the Harvest: Biotech, big money, and the future 
of food, Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus.
Chataway, J. and Tait, J. (2000) ‘Annex C11:  Monsanto Monograph’, 
PITA Project report [Policy Influences on Technology for Agriculture:  Chemicals, 
Biotechnology and Seeds], Milton Keynes & Edinburgh: Open University & 
University of Edinburgh. http://technology.open.ac.uk/cts/pita/AnnC11-mono-
monsanto.pdf (22/08/07).
Chedzey, J. (1986) ‘Conservation tillage in South Africa: weed control 
programmes in the rotation of maize/wheat in high rainfall conditions or under 
irrigation’, in Conservar el suelo: Simposium sobre minimo laboreo en cultivos 
herbaceos, Madrid, Spain: Universidad Politecnica de Madrid; 103-111.
Christian Aid (1999) Selling Suicide. Farming, false promises and genetic 
engineering in developing countries, London: Christian Aid.
Collins, S. C. (1986) ‘Conservation tillage development in Kenya’, in 
Conservar el suelo: Simposium sobre minimo laboreo en cultivos herbaceos, 
Madrid, Spain: Universidad Politecnica de Madrid; 125-129.
Coombs, R. (1995) ‘Firm Strategies and Technical Choices’, in A. Rip, T. 
J. Misa and J. Schot (eds) Managing Technology in Society: The Approach of 
Constructive Technology Assessment, London: Pinter; 331-345.
Coombs, R., Saviotti, P. and Walsh, V. (1992) ‘Technology and the firm: the 
convergence of economic and sociological approaches?’ in R. Coombs, P. Saviotti 
and V. Walsh, (eds) Technological Change and Company Strategies, London: 
Academic Press; 1-24.
34
3736
Culliton, B. J. (1990) ‘Monsanto Renews Ties to Washington University’, 
Science 247(4946), 2 March: 1027.
Davidson, F. C. (1985) ‘A President’s View of Biotechnology’, Journal of 
Animal Science 61.5: 1281-1284.
de Grassi, A. (2003) ‘Genetically Modified Crops and Sustainable Poverty 
Alleviation in Africa: An Assessment of Current Evidence’, Third World Network - 
Africa. http://www.eldis.org/go/display/?id=13194&type=Document (5 June 2008).
Deuten, J. J. and Rip, A. (2000) ‘The Narrative Shaping of a Product Creation 
Process’, in N. Brown, B. Rappert and A. Webster (eds) Contested Futures: A 
sociology of prospective techno-science, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Deuten, J. J., Rip, A. and Jelsma, J. (1997) ‘Societal Embedding and 
Product Creation Management’, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 9.2: 
131-148.
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown (1999) ‘DuPont. AgBiotech: Thanks, But No 
Thanks?’ New York: Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown. http://www.biotech-info.net/
Deutsche.pdf (18/06/07).
Dosi, G. (1982) ‘Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: A 
suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change’, 
Research Policy 11.3, June: 147-162.
Dosi, G., Pavitt, K. and Soete, L. (1990) The Economics of Technical Change 
and International Trade, New York: NYU Press.
Dunford, R. and Jones, D. (2000) ‘Narrative in strategic change’, Human 
Relations 53(9), September: 1207-1226.
Ekboir, J. (2003) ‘Adoption of no-till by small farmers: Understanding the 
generation of complex technologies’, in L. Garcia-Torres, J. Benites, A. Martínez-
Vilela and A. Holgado-Cabrera (eds) Conservation Agriculture, Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers; 501-508.
Ekboir, J., Boa, K. and Dankyi, A. A. (2002) ‘Impact of No-till Technologies 
in Ghana’, CIMMYT Economics Program Paper 02-01, Mexico: CIMMYT. http://
www.cimmyt.org/Research/Economics/map/research_results/program_papers/
pdf/EPP02_01.pdf (27/06/08).
ETC Group (2005) ‘Global Seed Industry Concentration - 2005’, ETC 
Group Communique 90. http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/48/01/
seedmasterfin2005.pdf (19/02/07).
FAO (2004) ‘Agricultural Biotechnology: Meeting the Needs of the 
Poor?’ State of Food and Agriculture Report 2004, Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organisation. http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y5160e/y5160e00.htm (21/02/07).
Findlay, J. B. R. and Hutchinson, N. C. (1999) ‘Development of Conservation 
Tillage in African Countries: A Partnership Approach’, in S. A. Breth (ed.) 
Partnerships for rural development in sub-Saharan Africa, Geneva, CH: Centre for 
Applied Studies in International Negotiations; 52-63.
Fligstein, N. (2001) The architecture of markets: an economic sociology of 
twenty-first century capitalist societies, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
FOEI (2007) ‘Who benefits from GM crops? An analysis of the global 
performance of GM crops (1996-2006)’, Amsterdam: Friends of the Earth 
International.
u (2008) ‘Who Benefits from GM Crops? The rise in pesticide use’, 
Amsterdam, NL: Friends of the Earth International.
Fowler, R. and Rockstrom, J. (2001) ‘Conservation tillage for sustainable 
agriculture: An agrarian revolution gathers momentum in Africa’, Soil & Tillage 
Research 61.182: 93-108.
Fraley, R. (1992) ‘Sustaining the Food Supply’, Bio/Technology 10.1, 
January: 40-43.
Gilbert, L. I. (1994) ‘Howard A. Schneiderman, 1927-1990’, Biographical 
Memoir, Washington DC, USA: National Academy of Sciences.
Gioia, D. A. and K. Chittipeddi (1991) ‘Sensemaking and sensegiving in 
strategic change initiation’, Strategic Management Journal 12.6, September: 433-448.
Glover, D. (2007a) ‘Farmer participation in private sector agricultural 
extension’, IDS Bulletin 38.5, November: 61-73.
u (2007b) ‘Monsanto and smallholder farmers:  a case-study on corporate 
accountability’, IDS Working Paper 277, Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies.
u (2007c) ‘Monsanto and smallholder farmers:  a case study in corporate 
social responsibility’, Third World Quarterly 28.4: 851-867.
u (2007d) ‘The Role of the Private Sector in Modern Biotechnology and Rural 
Development: The Case of the Monsanto Smallholder Programme’, unpublished 
DPhil thesis, September, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 
Brighton, UK.
3938
Grant, D., Keenoy, T. and Ostwick, C. (eds) (1998) Discourse and 
Organization, London: Sage.
Grant, L. (1997) ‘Monsanto’s bet: There’s gold in going green’, Fortune 
135.7: 116-118.
Green, K. (1991) ‘Shaping Technologies and Shaping Markets: Creating Demand 
for Biotechnology’, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 3.1: 57-76.
u (1992) ‘Creating demand for biotechnology: shaping technologies and 
markets’, in R. Coombs, P. Saviotti and V. Walsh (eds) Technological Change and 
Company Strategies, London: Academic Press; 164-184.
Hall, A. (1998) ‘Sustainability and Conservation Tillage: Managing the 
Contradictions’, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 35.2: 252-276.
Hertz, M., Magpili, L. P. and Mead, J. (2001) ‘Monsanto and the development 
of genetically modified seeds’, Darden Graduate School of Business Administration 
case study, Charlottesville: University of Virginia.
Hill, R. C. and Levenhagen, M. (1995) ‘Metaphors and Mental Models: 
Sensemaking and Sensegiving in Innovative and Entrepreneurial Activities’, Journal 
of Management 21.6: 1057-1074.
Hisano, S. (2005) ‘A Critical Observation on the Mainstream Discourse of 
Biotechnology for the Poor’, Tailoring Biotechnologies 1.2: 81-105.
Hodgson, J. (1992) ‘Biotechnology: Feeding the World?’ Bio/Technology 
10.1, January: 47-50.
Hopkins, M. A., Martin, P. A., Nightingale, P., Kraft, A. and Mahdi, S. (2007) 
‘The myth of the biotech revolution: An assessment of technological, clinical and 
organisational change’, Research Policy 36.4: 566-589.
Horsch, R. B. (1993) ‘Commercialization of genetically engineered crops’, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 342.1301, 29 
November: 287-291.
u (1995) ‘Transgenic crops: processes, products and problems’, in Induced 
mutations and molecular techniques for crop improvement, Proceedings of an 
international conference, 19-23 June 1995, Vienna, Austria: IAEA; 357-369.
Howe, G. L. and Graham, J. C. (1982) ‘A new herbicide for no-till corn and 
soybeans’, in Proceedings of the Northeastern Weed Science Society 1982; 50.
Hughes, T. P. (1987) ‘The Evolution of Large Technological Systems’, in W. 
E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes and T. J. Pinch (eds) The Social Construction of Technological 
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press; 51-82.
IAASTD (2008) ‘International Assessment of Agriculture Knowledge, 
Science and Technology for Development - Executive Summary of the Synthesis 
Report’. http://www.agassessment.org/ (18/07/08).
IFPRI (1999) ‘Biotechnology for developing country agriculture: problems 
and opportunities [ten briefs]’, 2020 Focus Briefs 2, Washington, DC: IFPRI.
Ismael, Y., Bennett, R. and Morse, S. (2001) ‘Biotechnology in Africa: The 
adoption and economic impacts of Bt cotton in the Makhatini Flats, Republic of 
South Africa’, paper presented at the Biotechnology Conference for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Johannesburg, SA, 26-27 September 2001.
Ito, M., Matsumoto, T. and Quinones, M. A. (2007) ‘Conservation tillage 
practices in sub-Saharan Africa: The experience of Sasakawa Global 2000’, Crop 
Protection 26.3, March: 417-423.
Jaffe, T. (1998) ‘Deal-a-day Bob’, Forbes 161.5, 9 March: 46-47.
Jamison, K. and Hård, M. (2003) ‘The Story-lines of Technological Change: 
Innovation, Construction and Appropriation’, Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management 15.1: 81-91.
Jansen, K. and Gupta, A. (no date) ‘Anticipating the Future: “Biotechnology 
for the Poor” Discourses and the Global Food Crisis’, unpublished work-in-progress, 
Wageningen, NL: Wageningen University.
Kemboi, M. P. (1986) ‘Reduced tillage experiences in Ethiopia’, in Conservar 
el suelo: Simposium sobre minimo laboreo en cultivos herbaceos, Madrid, Spain: 
Universidad Politecnica de Madrid; 131-134.
Landers, J. N. (2000) ‘Zero tillage development in tropical Brazil: The story 
of a successful NGO activity’, Wageningen, NL: FAO and Wageningen University. 
http://www.aenf.wau.nl/contil/workshop_SA/Program_of_past_workshop/
Landers_2000.pdf (27/06/08).
u (2001) ‘How and Why the Brazilian Zero Tillage Explosion Occurred’, 
in D. E. Stott, R. H. Mohtar and G. C. Steinhardt (eds) Sustaining the Global 
Farm. Selected papers from the 10th International Soil Conservation Organization 
Meeting held May, 24-29, 1999, at Purdue University and the USDA-ARS National 
Soil Erosion Research Laboratory; 29-39.
4140
Latour, B. (1987) Science in Action, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Law, J. (1987) ‘Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of 
Portuguese Expansion’, in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes and T. J. Pinch (eds) The 
Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and 
History of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 111-134.
u (1991) ‘Introduction: monsters, machines and sociotechnical relations’, 
in J. Law (ed.) A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and 
Domination, London: Routledge; 1-23.
Law, J. and Callon, M. (1992) ‘The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A Network 
Analysis of Technical Change’, in W. E. Bijker and J. Law (eds) Shaping Technology/ 
Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press; 21-52.
Leach, M., Scoones, I. and Stirling, A. (2007) ‘Pathways to Sustainability: 
an overview of the STEPS Centre approach’, STEPS Centre Working Paper 1, 
Brighton, UK: The STEPS Centre.
Lenzner, R. and Upbin, B. (1997) ‘Monsanto v. Malthus’, Forbes 159.5, 10 
March: 58-64.
Levidow, L. (2001) ‘Utilitarian bioethics? Market fetishism in the GM crops 
debate’, New Genetics and Society 20.1, April: 75-84.
MacKenzie, D. (1992) ‘Economic and sociological explanation of technical 
change’, in R. Coombs, P. Saviotti and V. Walsh (eds) Technological Change and 
Company Strategies, London: Academic Press; 25-48.
u (1996) Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press.
MacKenzie, D. and Wajcman, J. (eds) (1999) The Social Shaping of 
Technology, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Magretta, J. (1997) ‘Growth Through Sustainability: An Interview with 
Monsanto’s CEO, Robert B. Shapiro’, Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb: 79-88.
Matthews, J. (2003) ‘Rent-a-Mob’, The Ecologist 33, 22 January.
Mayer, S. (2002) ‘Genetically modified cotton: implications for small-scale 
farmers’, Pesticides Poverty and Livelihoods series, London: Pesticides Action 
Network UK.
McDonald, S. (2001) ‘Monsanto and Genetically Modified Organisms’, 
INSEAD Case Studies, Fontainebleau, France: INSEAD.
Melcher, R. A. (1998) ‘Commentary:  Monsanto may be counting its chickens’, 
Business Week, 30 November. http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1998/
b3606074.arc.htm (22/08/07).
Meyer, J. C. (1986) ‘Management of maize minimum and no-tillage systems 
in low rainfall areas’, in Conservar el suelo: Simposium sobre minimo laboreo en 
cultivos herbaceos, Madrid, Spain: Universidad Politecnica de Madrid; 113-124.
Michael, M. (2000) ‘Futures of the Present: From Performativity to 
Prehension’, in N. Brown, B. Rappert and A. Webster (eds) Contested Futures: A 
sociology of prospective techno-science, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate; 21-39.
Miller, H. I. (1997) Policy Controversy in Biotechnology: An Insider’s View, 
Austin, Texas, USA: Landes Company and Academic Press.
Mintzberg, H. (1978) ‘Patterns in Strategy Formation’, Management Science 
24.9, May: 934-948.
Monsanto (1978) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (1981) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (1983) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (1984) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (1988) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (1989) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (1995) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (1997) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (2000a) ‘Annual Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (2000b) ‘Leading Indian Research Institute Partners with Monsanto 
and Michigan State University to Develop “Golden Mustard”’, press release, 7 
December, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (2000c) ‘Monsanto Adds Support for “Golden Rice”; Opens its Genome 
Sequence Data to Worldwide Research Community’, press release, 4 August, St 
Louis: Monsanto.
u (2000d) ‘Monsanto Chief Executive Outlines Commitments on New 
Agricultural Technologies in the ‘New Monsanto Pledge’’, press release, 27 
November, St Louis: Monsanto.
u (2000e) ‘Scientists Achieve Major Breakthrough in Rice; Data to be Shared 
with Worldwide Research Community’, press release, 4 April, St Louis: Monsanto.
4342
u (2001) ‘Fulfilling Our Pledge: 2000–2001 Report’, St Louis: Monsanto.
Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G. (1977) ‘In search of useful theory of 
innovation’, Research Policy 6.1, January: 36-76.
u (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press.
Nightingale, P. and Martin, P. (2004) ‘The myth of the biotech revolution’, 
Trends in Biotechnology 22.11, November: 564-569.
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (1999) ‘Genetically Modified Crops: The 
Ethical and Social Issues’, London: Nuffield.
Oxfam (1999) ‘Genetically Modified Crops, World Trade and Food Security’, 
Position Paper, Oxford, UK: Oxfam. http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/
trade/downloads/gm_crops.pdf
Pinstrup-Andersen, P., Pandya-Lorch, R. and Rosegrant, M. W. (1999) 
‘World Food Prospects: Critical Issues for the Early Twenty-First Century’, IFPRI 
2020 Vision Food Policy Report, Washington, DC: IFPRI.
Pinstrup-Andersen, P. and Schioler, E. (2001) Seeds of Contention: World 
Hunger and the Global Controversy over GM Crops, London and Baltimore: IFPRI/ 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Raney, T. (2006) ‘Economic impact of transgenic crops in developing 
countries’, Current Opinion in Biotechnology 17, March: 174–178.
Resende, M. H. (1985) ‘Plantio direto: solucao para o arroz vermelho? 
[Direct drilling: a solution for red rice?]’, Lavoura Arrozeira 38.359: 32-36.
Resetar, S. A., Lachman, B. E., Lempert, R. J. and Pinto, M. M. (1999) 
Technology Forces at Work: Profiles of Environmental Research and Development 
at DuPont, Intel, Monsanto and Xerox: Rand Corporation.
Rosenberg, N. (1976) ‘On technological expectations’, The Economic 
Journal 86.343, September: 523-35.
Royal Society of London, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Brazilian 
Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Indian National Science 
Academy, Mexican Academy of Sciences and Third World Academy of Sciences 
(2000) ‘Transgenic Plants and World Agriculture’, Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press.
Sanz-Menéndez, L. and Cabello, C. (2000) ‘Expectations & Learning 
as Principles for Shaping the Future’, in N. Brown, B. Rappert and A. Webster 
(eds) Contested Futures: A sociology of prospective techno-science, Aldershot, 
UK: Ashgate.
Sastry, M. A., Bernicke, J. W. and Hart, S. L. (2002) ‘Changing Shades of 
Green: Coupling and Decoupling in Monsanto’s Environmental Orientations, 1991-
1997’, in A. J. Hoffman and M. J. Ventresca (eds) Organizations, Policy and the 
Natural Environment, Stanford: Stanford University Press; 262-290.
Schneiderman, H. A. and Carpenter, W. D. (1990) ‘Planetary patriotism: 
Sustainable agriculture for the future’, Environmental Science and Technology 
24.4: 466-473.
Schumacher, R. W. (1997) ‘Conservation tillage: a global perspective’, in S. 
Nagarajan, G. Singh and B. S. Tyagi (eds) Wheat: research needs beyond 2000, 
Proceedings of an international conference, 12-14 August 1997, Karnal, India; 257-262.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1987 [1943]) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 
London: Unwin.
Schurman, R. (2004) ‘Fighting “Frankenfoods”: Industry Opportunity 
Structures and the Efficacy of the Anti-Biotech Movement in Western Europe’, 
Social Problems 51.2, May: 243-268.
Schurman, R. and Munro, W. (2006) ‘Ideas, thinkers and social networks: 
The process of grievance construction in the anti-genetic engineering movement’, 
Theory and Society 35.1: 1-38.
Scoones, I. (2002) ‘Can agricultural biotechnology be pro-poor? A sceptical 
look at the emerging consensus’, IDS Bulletin 33.4, October: 114–119.
Scott, M. (1996) ‘Interview: Robert Shapiro, CEO of Monsanto, Co.: 
Monsanto’s Brave New World’, Business Ethics 10.1, January/February. http://
condor.depaul.edu/ethics/biz5.html (1/12/97).
Selin, C. (2007) ‘Expectations and the emergence of nanotechnology’, 
Science, Technology and Human Values 32.2, March: 196-220.
Shapiro, R. B. (1998) ‘Trade, Feeding the World’s People and Sustainability: 
A Cause for Concern’, The CEO Series 22, St Louis: Center for the Study of 
American Business, Washington University in St Louis.
u (1999) ‘How genetic engineering will save our planet’, The Futurist 33.4, 
April: 28-29.
4544
Simanis, E. and Hart, S. (2000) ‘The Monsanto Company: Quest for 
Sustainability’, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, Management Institute 
for Environment and Business.
Simon, H. A. (1976) Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organization, London: Collier Macmillan.
Simon, H. A., Egidi, M., Marris, R. L. and Viale, R. (eds) (1992) Economics, 
Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution, Aldershot: Elgar.
Smale, M., Zambrano, P., Falck-Zepeda, J. and Gruère, G. (2006) ‘Parables: 
Applied Economics Literature About the Impact of Genetically Engineered Crop 
Varieties in Developing Economies’, EPT Discussion Paper, Washington, DC, 
USA: IFPRI, Environment and Production Technology Division. http://www.ifpri.org/
divs/eptd/dp/papers/eptdp158.pdf (06/08/08).
Soteres, J. K. (1982) ‘Fall panicum control in continuous no-till corn’, in 
Proceedings of the North Central Weed Control Conference 1982; 46-47.
Specter, M. (2000) ‘The Pharmageddon Riddle’, The New Yorker, 
10 April: 58-71.
Tait, J. and Chataway, J. (2005) ‘The governance of corporations, 
technological change, and risk: examining industrial perspectives on the 
development of genetically modified crops’, Environment and Planning C 25.1: 21-37.
The Economist (1997) ‘Face value: The green gene giant’, The Economist 
343.8014, 26 April: 66.
UNDP (2001) ‘Making New Technologies Work for Human Development’, 
Human Development Report, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://
hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2001/en/pdf/completenew.pdf (14 February 2007).
van Gelder, S. (1999) ‘Corporate Futures’, Yes! Magazine, Summer. http://
www.yesmagazine.org/article.asp?ID=752 (08/05/06).
van Lente, H. (2000) ‘Forceful Futures: From Promise to Requirement’, 
in N. Brown, B. Rappert and A. Webster (eds) Contested Futures: A sociology of 
prospective techno-science, Aldershot: Ashgate; 43-63.
Vellema, S. (2004) ‘Monsanto facing uncertain futures: immobile artefacts, 
financial constraints and public acceptance of technological change’, in K. 
Jansen and S. Vellema (eds) Agribusiness and Society. Corporate Responses 
to Environmentalism, Market Opportunities and Public Regulation, London: Zed 
Books; 42-67.
Vilamajó, J. C. (1995) ‘El laboreo de conservación en otros países 
[Conservation tillage in other countries]’, Agricultura Revista Agropecuaria 64.759, 
October: 855-857.
Vorley, W. and Keeney, D. (1998) ‘Solving for Pattern’, in W. Vorley and 
D. Keeney (eds) Bugs in the System: Redesigning the pesticide industry for 
sustainable agriculture, London: Earthscan; 193-215.
Walmac, A. (1997) ‘This giant is harvesting 20% growth by focusing on its 
solid brand names’, Money 26.3, March: 68.
Walsh, V. (2002) ‘Creating Markets for Biotechnology’, International Journal 
of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 10.2: 33-46.
Weick, K. E. (1995) Sensemaking in Organizations, London: Sage.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M. and Obstfeld, D. (2005) ‘Organizing and the 
Process of Sensemaking’, Organization Science 16.4, July-August: 409-421.
Whipple, D. (1999) ‘Seeds of controversy’, The Futurist 33.8, October: 10-12.
Wright, S. (1994) Molecular Politics: Developing American and British 
Regulatory Policy for Genetic Engineering, 1972-1982, Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press.
